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ABSTRACT 
State Behavior and the Occurrence of State Success 
by 
Brendan Mark Morris 
Dr. Tiffiany Howard, Examination Committee Chair 
Associate Professor of Political Science 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
The start of the twenty-first century has coincided with the emergence of the concept of state 
failure as a major humanitarian and security concern. While the occurrence of state failure has 
received much attention, there has been little agreement on the actual definition and 
conceptualization of state failure. This study intends to aid in the improvement on the discourse 
of state failure by providing a new approach on failed states that analyzes shifts in state fragility. 
In this new approach, this study focuses on the occurrence of state success and explain how 
states succeed by focusing on the fulfillment of the different classes of obligations states are 
expected to complete under the modern interpretation of the nation-state. To show utility of this 
study’s conceptualization on the driving factors behind state success and state failure, a 
multinomial logit analysis is conducted that tests possible determinants of success and failure 
against occurrences of transitions for states based off their level or fragility risk. Findings from 
the analysis reveal a strong causal relationship between the completion of state obligations and 
occurrences of state success. A noteworthy finding from the analysis is the very influential 
relationship between the providing of human developmental public goods, including education 
and health care, and the occurrence of state success.    
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The turn of the century has coincided with occurrences that have questioned the accepted 
assumptions of statehood inherent to the nation-state system. This includes the near collapse of 
several states, including Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Central 
African Republic (CAR), South Sudan, and Libya; destabilizing civil wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen; the rise of violent non-state actors such as al Qaeda and the Islamic 
State1; and massive refugee movements across international borders. Recent headlines of civil 
wars, refugee crises, and terrorism have created a bleak image regarding the status of global 
affairs, with many scholars pointing to state failure as the primary motivator behind these 
international problems (Howard, 2014; Iqbal and Starr, 2016; Rotberg, 2003). These upheavals 
have prompted the impression that failed states have become a significant threat to world peace 
(Bush, 2002).  
In response to these assumptions on security in an era of state failure, many scholars and 
policymakers have begun to investigate the causes and preventive solutions to the political 
phenomenon of state failure in attempts to help avoid the dangerous political, economic, and 
humanitarian consequences that result from failed states (Bates, 2008b; Goldstone et al, 2010; 
Howard, 2010b; Rotberg, 2004). The study of state failure in the past decade has produced 
myriad research on the characteristics and causes of state failure. The literature has been 
disharmonious regarding what state failure is intended to represent as a political concept and has 
been unable to provide universally applicable solutions towards helping fragile states avoid 
failure. The discourse on state failure has produced many criticisms of the overall concept, 
                                                 
1. Also known as ISIS, ISIL, and Daesh. 
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contributing to the misapplication of the concept in actual security and diplomatic policies 
(Easterly, 2010; The Economist, 2011). 
The criticisms over the concept of state failure have led many scholars towards either 
redefining the concept or dropping the concept in its entirety (Call, 2008; Newman 2009). While 
the concept of state failure may be flawed, its overall representation of a dysfunctional political 
unit has merit. Certain identified failed states such as the DRC and Somalia do not meet the 
expected standards that we attribute to sovereign nation-states (Hobbes, 1651/1904; Weber, 
1958). To allow for the concept of state failure to be a practical explanatory model of state 
behavior, it is the opinion of this study that the concept requires a new interpretation on the 
purpose and functionality of the modern nation-state. To develop this new interpretation, it may 
be beneficial to provide a new outlook on the function of states that is often overlooked on the 
study of state failure. This study shall aid in the understanding of state failure by approaching the 
issue of failure from a different perspective. In the place of the customary question of why states 
fail, this study will ask the opposite inquiry: why do states succeed?  
State Success in the 21st Century 
The question of success for states is often overlooked in the analysis of state failure, as 
comprehensive studies on the success of states tend to be limited to case studies and historical 
analyses and are routinely included only as a control for comparisons with failed states. In these 
studies, success is generally poorly defined with a focus on basic measures of economic growth 
or democracy as indicators of success, ignoring the overall functionality or purpose of the state. 
Successful states are usually deemed successful based upon the premise that they have not failed, 
yet these studies provide little insight into how these states have become successful and what 
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policies allowed these states to succeed. These flaws merit an inquiry into the question of why 
states succeed.  
The lack of a comprehensive definition of success for states has greatly limited the 
understanding of not only the concept of success, but also the entire of concept of state failure. 
As typical characteristics of successful states, such as stability, economic growth, political 
liberalization, and higher standards of living, have been given as a definition of state success, this 
manner of definition has left the concept of state success lacking in the fundamental principles of 
what a successful state is to represent. Just as the concept of state failure represents more than 
just the characteristics of failed states, the concept of state success requires a greater foundation 
based around the concept of a successful state. The concept of state success requires a new 
conceptualization that establishes the expected operation and purpose of the nation-state.  
The occurrence of state success is unique and is not an automatic result from the lack of 
state failure occurring. Looking at the status of states regarding their level of fragility, an 
accepted indicator of state failure risk, one may see that overall, the state has strengthened as a 
functioning political entity over the last decade. A review of the data from the Fragile State 
Index (FSI)2 illustrates the fact that more states have reduced their level of fragility at a 
significant level over the last ten years compared to the number of states which have seen their 
level of fragility worsen (Fund for Peace, 2016). 3 Table 1 lists the states that have been found in 
improving situations over this period. The negative scores associated with each state indicates 
                                                 
2. Originally titled the Failed State Index.  
3. The Fragile State Index scores individual states based off their perceived capability against twelve risks 
to state stability. These indicators include Demographic Pressures, Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, 
Group Grievance, Human Flight, Uneven Development, Poverty and Economic Decline, Legitimacy of the State, 
Public Services, Human Rights, Security Apparatus, Factionalized Elites, and External Intervention. States are 
scored on a scale of one to ten for each indicator, with higher scores representing higher risks of failure. The scores 
from each indicator are summed to developed a total failed state index score which may range from 12 (being highly 
stable) to 120 (being failed) (Fund for Peace, 2016).  
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the level of decline in fragility for a state when their initial fragility index score in 2006 is 
compared with their current fragility score (2016).4 A brief analysis of the FSI data reveals fifty-
four states that have had their overall fragility index score reduced by five points or more. Of the 
fifty-four states that have improved their situations, fourteen of them have reduced their fragility 
rating by ten points or more. Comparing these “successful” states with the other states in the 
analysis, eighty-four states reported no difference between the two surveys and only forty states 
have seen their fragility worsen by an index score of five points or more.  
 
                                                 
4. Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Brunei Darussalam, Cape Verde, Grenada, Maldives, Malta, Qatar, 
Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United Arab 
Emirates were not included in the 2006 Fragile State Index survey. Their measurement for this analysis consists of 
the difference between their 2016 index score and their initial index score in 2007.  
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Table 1. States with Improving Situations since 20055 
 
                                                 
5. Data recorded from the 2006 and 2016 Fragile State Index surveys (Fund for Peace, 2016). 
(Fund for Peace, 2016) 
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The result of more states improving their level of fragility warrants the need to 
investigate the causes behind the success of these states. A general examination of these states 
shows several differences between them, such as their representation of different regions in the 
world, having various styles of governance, and different levels of economic development. 
General theories of success for states that have been applied in the past cannot explain why these 
fifty-four states have achieved success in this ten-year period. This diverse class of states 
presents several important questions about the notion of success for states, including what role 
the state plays in promoting success or creating failure, whether democratic and economic 
liberalization plays a role in the stability of the state, and whether foreign political and economic 
relations have an impact on the states either experiencing or avoiding failure. As the problems 
associated with failed states continue to be a significant concern for the coming years, a 
comprehensive understanding of the fundamental functionality of states is required. A new 
theory of state behavior is required that can answer how states succeed in the twenty-first 
century. 
A Theory of State Behavior 
The notion of success for states requires a strong theoretical foundation on the purpose of 
the state and how it is intended to function. The theories that have been applied to explain why 
states succeed so far have tended to overlook the requirements and function of the state, instead 
focusing on economic development, democratization, and military prowess as their primary 
identifiers and explanations for success (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Fukuyama, 2011; 2014; 
Morris, 2010). To determine why these states have achieved recent success, a new theory on the 
functional role of the state needs to be developed that accounts for contemporary 
conceptualizations of statehood.  
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Any theory on the state must first define what the state entails. The generally accepted 
notion of the state is that it is a political unit that has (1) a defined territory; (2) a permanent 
population; (3) an effective government; and (4) the capacity to enter formal relations with other 
states (Seventh International Conference of American States. 1993).  These assumptions of the 
state only provide the definitional parameters of the state, but does not identify how a state is 
supposed to act. Modern states hold a much larger expectation regarding the mode in which they 
interact with the populations under their authority. The traditional view of the state, claims the 
state as a sovereign power has that has the right of non-interference from any opposing state 
regarding the governing of its own sovereign territory (Campbell and Hall, 2015). Today, states 
are held at higher standards in the manner they govern. International laws and norms, such as the 
Geneva Convention (1949), the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (United Nations 
General Assembly, 1948b), and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (United Nations General Assembly,1948a), may be viewed as some of the modern 
defining guidelines for the functional role and proper action of the state. The multiple treaties 
found in these international agreements outline the basic rights of individuals and how they are 
to be treated by the state. Not only do these treaties restrict the repressive power of the state, they 
also identify certain public goods that the state must provide for these rights to be respected. 
These include security, healthcare, education, and liberal justice. By guaranteeing the rights to 
these goods, these treaties place several obligations on states regarding the livelihoods of their 
populations.  
It is the opinion of this study that a theory of state behavior may be derived around the 
concept of “state obligation” based upon the accepted responsibilities attributed to states 
regarding the betterment of their populations. Modern notions of statehood require the 
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assessment of how states impact the lives of the people under their authority, with proper 
functioning states providing positive public goods that aid in the social and economic 
advancement of their people and poorly functioning states being deficient in providing these 
goods, and at worse providing negative goods such as political repression that harms the 
development of their public. With this view of state obligation regarding the proper functionality 
of states, a theory of state behavior can be developed that argues that states which meet their 
obligations to its public properly meet their overall functional purpose, and thus receive the 
benefits of a successful state. Inversely states which do not meet their obligations to the public 
may be viewed as failing in their functional role, and thus experience the problems associated 
with failed states.  
This study hypothesizes that the fulfillment of a state’s obligation is directly tied to its 
ability to reduce its fragility risk and function in a successful manner. Applying this theory to 
real world states, we may use the two very different cases of Germany and North Korea. Looking 
at how Germany functions, one can see the surplus of positive public goods it provides for its 
people, including an expanded healthcare and education system as well as protected liberal rights 
for its people. Germany is also rated as being highly stable with a very low fragility ranking 
under the FSI (ranked as 165 out of 178 in the 2016 survey). Under the theory of state obligation, 
Germany’s successful meeting of its obligations to its public has corresponded with its low 
fragility level, classifying Germany as being successful as a state. In comparison, North Korea 
has failed to provide the necessities needed for its public to survive and thrive, including 
adequate food security, education, and healthcare. Along with this lack of ability to provide for 
its people, the North Korean state has continually shown “systematic, widespread and gross 
human rights violations” against its own population (United Nations Human Rights Council, 
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2014), including violence, imprisonment, summary execution, and the lack of any form of liberal 
justice. By not providing the necessary goods to its public as well protecting the rights of its 
people, North Korea has failed to meet its expected obligations. This poor functionality of the 
state has caused North Korea to suffer from a high-level fragility, even with their authoritative 
control over the entire state (ranked 30 out of 178 in the 2016 FSI survey). Table 2 illustrates this 
comparison of Germany and North Korea below. 
 
Table 2. Evaluating State Success and Failure Around State Obligations 
  
Comparing the cases of Germany and North Korea, we can see two clearly opposing 
cases of states in respect to the assessment of whether they are succeeding or failing as a 
sovereign nation-state. Applying this method of evaluation to all states, this study contends a link 
between state functionality, based on assessments of success or failure, and the fulfillment of 
certain obligations of the state, can be established.  
Research Design 
 To assess how the notion of state obligation may help explain state failure and state 
success, this study will implement a rigorous quantitative analysis that will test the relationship 
between measures of positive public goods associated with the obligations of the state and the 
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level of success a state experiences. This study will focus on states that have shown signs of 
success and failure from 2005 to 2015. This study will identify states that have been succeeding 
in this time frame by using data from the Fund for Peace’s Fragile State Index. This study will 
then measure the decrease in the level of fragility and use this measure as a proxy variable to 
represent a grade of success for states.  
Identified successful states will be analyzed, along with measures of various public goods 
the state is expected to provide, using a multinomial logit statistical analysis. Relying on this 
method of analysis, this study will be able to identify any significant relationships between the 
success of states and the obligations the states meet in relationship to their populace. Relying on 
the specific obligations of the state derived from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
this study will divide state obligations into three unique levels of obligation. These include 
primary public goods necessary for the existence of the state, specifically security and order of 
the state, and secondary obligations that include public goods and services that allow for greater 
opportunities of development and prosperity for a people.  
 This study theorizes that there exists a relationship between the obligations of the state 
and occurrences of success and failure, where the decision of states to fulfill these obligations 
represent the core functionality for states. This study contends that the completion of these 
obligations are prime influences on the occurrence of success and failure for states. Through this 
analysis, several hypotheses regarding how these obligations each influence occurrences of state 
success and state failure will be tested. The findings of this analysis will allow for a greater 
understanding of the importance of the state’s fulfillment of these obligations as well as provide 
clear indicators for the causes of state failure and state success. 
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 Importance of Study 
 Determining why states succeed is an important task that may help in developing a 
deeper understanding of the concept of state failure. By fully investigating the concept of state 
success and identifying the determinants of state success, this novel approach will shed light on 
the parameters of what success and failure entails regarding states and help develop more 
effective strategies to prevent state decline and failure. Given that failed states have been linked 
to the proliferation of dangerous non-state actors, such as terrorists and criminal organizations 
(Cilliers, 2003; Howard, 2014), as well as humanitarian and refugee crises (Howard, 2010b), it 
has become overtly clear that the international security and humanitarian problems tied to failed 
states have not diminished and are projected to only worsen in the coming years (Frazer, 2008).6 
The need to understand what causes states to fail and what can be done to help potential failed 
states find a path to success is a vital task.  
It is the opinion of this study that a framework for state success can be developed that is 
in line with a new interpretation of state failure, which may be able to explain how fragile states 
can improve their political, economic, and humanitarian positions, and avoid failure. By studying 
the recent cases of state success and failure, this study hopes to identify the key determinants of 
success in states.  
 
 
 
                                                 
 6. Recent trends in the Fragile State Index data shows the last seven straight years have seen more countries 
having either improved or remained steady from the previous year than have worsened. While this data shows that 
the world overall has become more stable, we have seen recent cases of failed states breaking down into violent 
conflict that has the potential for drastic international security concerns (including genocide in the Central African 
Republic, civil war in Mali, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and Syria, and the ongoing rebellion and annexation of territory 
occurring in Ukraine) (Fund for Peace, 2016). 
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Plan of Study 
 The plan for this study is to derive a new framework of state failure and state success and 
employ this framework to the analysis of the determinants of state fragility. To develop this new 
understanding of state failure and success, it will be important review how state failure has been 
conceptualized in the literature so far. Chapter 2 will conduct this review of the literature and 
outline how state failure has been conceptualized and employed. Following this review, 
criticisms of the current state of the literature on state failure will be analyzed and potential 
resolutions to weaknesses of the conceptualization of state failure will be provided. Following 
this review, Chapter 3 will attempt to remedy some of the shortcomings in the conceptualization 
of state failure by providing a new conceptualization based upon the occurrences of state 
transitions toward success. With this new conceptualization of state behavior and state 
obligations laid out, Chapter 4 will present the quantitative analysis that employs this new 
conceptualization of the transitions to success and failure for states. The concluding chapter, 
Chapter 5 will interpret the findings of the quantitative analysis and then evaluate these results 
and their potential application to development policies and how they may help fragile states 
strengthen their internal dynamics and avoid failure.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter provides a review of the academic debates regarding the nation-state, 
including the theoretical conceptualizations of the state, the purpose and functionality of the 
state. With this review, this study will be able to explain how the state has developed as a 
political authority, as well as lay the foundation for the notion of state-obligation to be a primary 
assumption regarding the proper functionality of the state. The development of a new theory on 
state success will require this new understanding of what the nation-state is intended to represent 
and the proper role it plays regarding its population. This review will begin with the examination 
of the theoretical notions of the state with the generally accepted aspects of statehood, including 
the notions of political authority, legitimacy, and sovereignty. Following this initial introduction 
to the concept of the state, this review will examine the many theories on the purpose of the state, 
including the absolutist, ethical, class, and constitutionalist theories. As the review of the state’s 
theoretical context will provide a basic conceptualization of the state around its functionality and 
purpose, this study will also consider the multiple notions of “state failure” in the context of its 
definition, conceptualization, and theoretical processes found in the literature.  
The Concept of the Nation-State 
 Since its establishment with the Peace of Westphalia7 in1648, the nation-state has 
functioned as an organizing force over territory that also provides a sense of identity to a people. 
The concept of the nation-state has been paramount towards our understanding of a multitude of 
political and social events, including international relations, civil society, economic and political 
                                                 
 7. There has been a debate over the actual impact of the Peace of Westphalia in developing the nation-state. 
Osiander argues that the actual peace treaty that ended the Thirty Years War did not create a nation-state system, but 
in fact 19th and 20th century treaties created and enacted the notion of state sovereignty with anti-Hapsburg 
propaganda of the 17th century being the major influence in developing the international system (2001).  
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development, political violence, revolution and civil war (Nisbet, 1962; Skocpol, 1985). While 
its importance has been unequivocal, its comprehension has not. A review of the literature on the 
state reveals will provide an impression the state as still a highly contentious concept. The 
following sections will explore some of these debates surrounding the concept of the state. 
Since its inception during the 17th century, the concept of the state has been presented as 
an abstract concept (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987; Skinner, 1989); earning the impression of a 
faceless omnipresent entity. As a political entity, the state has been considered an institution of 
political organization as well as a social actor with its own interests and goals (Evans et al, 1985; 
Nettl, 1968). From these considerations, scholars have developed conceptualizations and theories 
on the purpose and actions of states that explain the state around the terms of power and 
responsibility. 
Modern conceptualizations of the state show the state as a division of power between the 
political authority of the state and its public (Morris, 1998; Skocpol, 1979). This division of 
power is typically viewed to be one-sided, as states are intended to maintain control over society 
through coercive force and obedience from the public. This can be seen with the 
conceptualizations of the state from Oppenheimer, who defines the state as ‘conquers over the 
conquered’ (1975), and Tilly, who compares the state to a mafia “protection racket” (1990b). 
These definitions of the state illustrate this division of power between the state and society. This 
can be seen in the traditional view of the state, such as from Hobbes who defines the state as a 
sovereign authority that has absolute power over the actions of individuals under it (Hobbes, 
1651/1904), and similarly, modern interpretations of the state, such as Weber’s definition, which 
characterizes it as a “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force” within defined territorial 
boundaries (1958).  
15 
 
Images of the state from the definitional aspect of power present the state as being 
tyrannical, and throughout history traditional states have relied on extreme violence to command 
obedience and achieve their own exploitive gains (Cooney, 1997; Fukuyama, 2011; 2014; 
Giddens, 1985). Notions of statehood are more than just violence and exploitation; otherwise 
violent criminal gangs or rebel groups may be considered as states. The recent case of the 
Islamic State and the crumbling civil-state under its control has shown this to be true (Sly, 2014). 
Looking at the concept of the modern state, other definitional components, such as territoriality, 
constitutionality, impersonal power, bureaucracy, and taxation have been associated with the 
conceptualization of the state to provide a more concrete status of statehood (Giddens, 1985; 
Hall and Ikenberry, 1989; Pierson, 2011). Each of these components has been argued to have had 
an important impact on how states function, such as how the concept of territory promotes the 
necessity of the state to protect its borders and people from foreign invaders (Kratochwil, 1986) 
and the existence for the capacity of taxation allows for the state to achieve its functioning goals 
(Tilly, 1990a). These different components of the state can all be broken-down into three core 
aspects that explain the functionality of the state: authority, legitimacy, and sovereignty. Each of 
these aspects provides an important definitional foundation for the idea of the state, and when 
each of these aspects are combined they reinforce one another to form a functioning political 
entity.  
Aspects of Statehood 
 Political Authority 
 The first aspect of the state is political authority, which may be considered as exercising 
power over others. This aspect measures both the capacity of the state (Besley and Perrson, 
2010; Goldstone et al, 2010) as well as its effectiveness as a state (Marshall, 2008; Marshall and 
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Cole, 2014; Rice and Patrick, 2008). The authority of the state represents its ability to control 
and shape behavior through the use or threat of force, and thus has been viewed as the dominant 
means of how the state operates. Authority allows states to raise revenue, promote the general 
welfare of its citizens, and mediate violence within its borders. With the ability to prevent 
potential challengers from controlling the competing interests within society, the state promotes 
order and stability.  
Legitimacy  
The second aspect of the state is legitimacy, which represents the acceptance of the 
authority of the state by the people under its rule. What legitimacy entails has not been clearly 
agreed upon by scholars (Hardin, 2007; Hart, 1961/1994; Stinchcombe, 1982; Weber, 1958), as 
it has been viewed both in positive terms of power over people, either forcibly or 
constitutionally, and normative terms of the right to rule (Hobbes, 1651/1994). Weber explains 
legitimacy as “the state is a relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by the means 
of legitimate (i.e. considered to be legitimate) violence. If the state is to exist, the dominated 
must obey the authority claimed by the powers that be” (1958). John Stuart Mill presents 
legitimacy as a sense of law and order, where the people look towards the state to address their 
own personal grievances rather than settling these grievances through their own violent acts 
(1991). In its most basic terms, legitimacy represents the acceptance of the leadership of the state 
as the absolute ruler.  
 The legitimacy of the state may come from several sources, such as religion, the social 
contract, or as a consequence of the state bringing order to society (Hardin, 2007). Whatever the 
source of legitimacy, it is important that other powers-to-be in the state accept the authority of 
the state and act to confirm its decisions (Tilly, 1990b). To maintain this sense of legitimacy, 
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states must either co-opt or subjugate potential rivals through three complementing principles: 
(1) legitimacy is acquired and exercised through established rules; (2) the rules are justifiable 
according to socially accepted beliefs about the rightful source of authority, and the proper ends 
and standards of government; and (3) positions of authority are confirmed by express consent or 
affirmation of appropriate subordinates, and by recognition from other legitimate authorities 
(Beetham, 2001: 110). Without these principles being met, those who claim the authority of the 
state will be continuously met by those who challenge the rule of the state.  
Sovereignty 
 The third aspect of the state is the concept of sovereignty. The term sovereignty can be 
interpreted to mean many things. Krasner identifies four types of sovereignty, including 
interdependence sovereignty (control over one’s borders); domestic sovereignty (political 
authority of the state within its borders); international legal sovereignty (formal recognition by 
external sovereign powers), and westphalian sovereignty (the absence of authoritative external 
influences) (2001). These different types of sovereignty are all mutual to one another, forming a 
conventional sense of sovereignty that illustrates the assumed rules, which dictate the 
international system. In this system, sovereign states operate with other sovereign states, where 
all states are equal regarding their sovereignty and do not answer to any higher legal power 
(Gilpin, 1981; Waltz, 1979). 
 While authority can be viewed as the physical capability of the state, and legitimacy as 
the obedience towards the state, sovereignty is the recognition of the state as the organization of 
a territory into an encompassing political component. States that are members of the United 
Nations have not received membership based upon their authority or legitimacy, but from the 
recognition of the state’s sovereign status. Even in states that may be viewed as having a “false 
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sovereignty” because they do not possess the two other aspects of statehood (authority and 
legitimacy), such as the DRC or Somalia, they are still recognized as the sovereign over their 
territorial borders (Atzil, 2006/2007; Herbst, 2004).  
 By applying these three aspects of statehood, an image of the state can be developed. The 
aspects of authority, legitimacy, and sovereignty are all mutually related, as they all reinforce 
one another (see Figure 1), and the foundation for the state may only exist when all three aspects 
are functioning together. For example, while authority provides the state the capability to rule 
through force, this authority can only be applied successfully if those who are under rule believe 
that the state is legitimate in applying such force (Beetham, 2001). This relationship between 
authority and legitimacy is reciprocal, as legitimacy can only exist when the monopoly of 
violence and coercion over a population is maintained by the state (Stinchcombe, 1982). A 
state’s sovereignty allows both authority and legitimacy to exist as well. By fixing borders and 
restricting foreign influence, states can establish a sense of authority without foreign challengers, 
and are provided legitimacy to rule given its recognition as the sovereign by external actors. 
Authority and legitimacy also reinforce a state’s sovereignty by providing an image of a stable 
and legal representative of the state for foreign powers to negotiate with. The joining of the three 
aspects of statehood together form the foundation of the state; and combining this foundation 
with the theoretical purpose of the state, we may suppose the functionality of the state and 
examine how states meet their functional purposes.  
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Figure 1. Reciprocal Relationships of the Aspects of Statehood 
 
Theories on the State 
 As the unified aspects of statehood provide a sense of foundation for the state, it is 
important to review the overall purpose of the state. Various theories have attempted to explain 
the purpose of the state regarding its interactions with the populations that fall under its rule, 
including theories of liberalism, Marxism, social contract theory, and rationalism/behaviorism. 
These theories have placed the purpose of the state in both positive and negative terms, where 
the state has been viewed as the custodian of the people whose purpose is to protect them from 
internal and external harm, as well as a warden whose job is to keep order over a captive 
population. Considering the functional role of the state, these theories present the state as a tool 
of the powerful over the powerless as well as an equalizer between these two groups.  
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 This review will consider four primary theories of the state that have been identified in the 
literature, including the Absolutist Theory, Ethical Theory, Class Theory, and Constitutional 
Theory (Howard, 2010b).  
The Absolutist Theory 
 The absolutist theory of the state traces back to the work of 16th century political 
philosophers Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes, who argue for the existence of a sovereign 
authority that maintains absolute power and supremacy of the law over the people that it rules. 
Under the absolutist theory, the sovereign, represented by a monarchy, according to Bodin and 
Hobbes, is synonymous with the state. The interests of the sovereign are the interests of the state. 
All land and wealth within the state is owed to the sovereign, and all individuals within the 
territory of the state are subject to the sovereign’s rule. According to absolutists, the sovereign 
authority can decree the laws of society, but is not yet bound by these same laws. Bodin 
describes the sovereign authority as, “he is absolutely sovereign who recognizes nothing, after 
God, that is greater than himself” (1992). The sovereign cannot be challenged nor constrained by 
any mortal being or legal doctrine and maintains control through having say over the lives and 
livelihoods of its subjects. 
 The role of the state towards society for absolutists is creation and preservation of order. 
For Hobbes, the existence of the sovereign allows for the end to the “war against all” and stops 
the violent and unstable situation found in the state of nature of men. Being the absolute power, 
the state may act unchained from restrictions and may maintain order through complete control 
over society; mostly with violent force. This allows the state to protect the overall society from 
internal and external threats. By keeping order and ending the violent relations between 
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individuals and groups in society, the existence of the state allows society to progress 
economically and socially. 
The Ethical Theory 
 The ethical theory of the state developed with the idealist theories of the 18th and 19th 
century, most prominently in the work of German philosopher George W. F. Hegel. Under the 
ethical theory, the state represents the development of the individual through the process of 
socialization from the family level organization to being an included part of civil society. 
Through the complete socialization of the individual, the state emerges from the desire of the 
individual to participate in the governmental process, making the traditionally external system of 
laws into an essential part of the individual’s development.  
 Under the ethical theory, the purpose of the state is to allow for the development and 
practice of personal freedom. According to Hegel, “Society and the State are the very conditions 
in which Freedom is realized” (1991). Unlike the absolutist theory, the state is to be limited in its 
power and control over society so that freedom may develop. Instead of controlling people, the 
state shapes behavior by developing a universal notion of ethicality through its laws and 
institutions (Hegel, 2002). The state is to represent the interests of all its citizens, but also 
provide the universal benefits of objectivity, truth, and ethicality that can guide the subjective 
opinions and whims of individuals (Hegel, 2002). Society can only develop and progress through 
the existence of the state and its ability to shape society’s function around ethical and moral 
principles. 
The Class Theory 
 The class theory of the state has been developed as a critique of Hegelian ethical state 
theory. The class theory of the state follows a Marxist view of the state and civil society, where 
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the state serves to protect the interests of the ruling class and assure its dominance through the 
protection of private property (de Jasay, 1985). Under the class theory, society is divided among 
unequal classes based upon the division of labor in society, including wage-laborers, capitalists, 
and land owners, and the oppression of the lower classes at the hands of the powerful classes 
(Marx, 1978).  
 The purpose of the state under the class theory is to reinforce the divisions of society by 
exploiting the lowers classes through the interests of property and capitalism. The state is 
organized around the power and the powerless. Engels describes the state as “an organization of 
the possessing class for its protection against the non-possessing class” (1978). Under the class 
theory, the state does not serve the interests of everyone, but only the interests of those who are 
in power. As Marxism calls for the end of the state through the elimination of private property, 
the state may be viewed as being detrimental towards the overall progress of society.  
The Constitutional Theory 
 The constitutional theory of the state is largely the product of 18th century social contract 
theory developed by Locke, Mills, and Rousseau. The constitutional theory’s origin comes from 
the absolutist theory of the state, with the notion of a sovereign authority ruling over an 
established territorial boundary to bring political unity to a diverse moral and ethical population. 
The constitutional theory of the state diverges from the absolutist theory with the inclusion of 
liberal ideals of limited government and natural political rights of the people. The major tenets of 
the constitutional theory include the prerequisite of some form of a constitution to outline the 
foundation of how the state is to be structured. The constitution serves as a contract between the 
people and the state, where the people relinquish some of their personal sovereignty to the state 
in return for necessary public goods and services that only the state can provide (Barker, 1960). 
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The constitution also serves to define the power of the state and its limitations towards ruling 
over its population.  
 Under the constitutional theory, the purpose of the state is to provide the rule of law over 
civil society and the state itself. Locke describes the purpose of the state with the following 
passage from his Second Treatise on Civil Government: 
 
But though men when they enter into society give up the equality, liberty, and executive power 
they had in the state of nature into the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the 
legislative as the good of the society shall require, yet it being only with an intention in everyone 
the better to preserve himself, his liberty and property (for no rational creature can be supposed to 
change his condition with an intention to be worse), the power of the society or legislative 
constituted by them can never be supposed to extend farther than the common good, but is obliged 
to secure everyone’s property by providing against those three defects above-mention that made 
the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy (Locke, 1690/1980). 
 
Liberal thinkers such as Locke view the state as a necessary evil whose existence is required to 
allow for civil society to function in a good and proper manner (Karlson, 2002). Modern 
constitutional theorists view the purpose of the state as allowing for the economic and social 
progress of society through the protection of individual liberty. Unlike the absolutist theory 
which focuses on control over society by the sovereign authority, the notion of popular 
sovereignty under the constitutional theory maintains the essence of the consent of the governed 
as necessary for the state to function properly.  
 Each of these theories on the purpose of the state provides a stark view on the role states 
play regarding the society they govern. While maintaining different perspectives, each theory 
does represent the state as a powerful being that can shape the composition and political behavior 
of their public. These theories show that the state has some form of responsibility towards the 
people under their rule, with the responsibility as either a controlling, protective, or equalizing 
force over society. When we incorporate the several aspects of statehood into these theories, we 
may develop a sense of functionality regarding how states are intended to operate as well as 
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develop a sense of how well states operate in completing their function. Considering this sense of 
functionality, we may contemplate the concept of state failure.  
State failure is a very contentious concept, which has produced a myriad of 
conceptualizations along with multiple criticisms on its application towards explaining real life 
examples of problem-ridden states. While these criticisms have severely impacted the utility of 
this concept, it is the opinion of this study that state failure may offer important insights into the 
proper function of states. The following section will review the concept of state failure and the 
many debates over the topic found in the literature. 
State Functionality and State Failure  
The functionality of the state is understood by its ability to maintain and exercise the 
aspects of statehood and whether it can meet its intended purpose as a political 
actor/organization. Since the end of the Cold War, scholars and policymakers have developed the 
concept of state failure to explain the lack of functionality found in certain states, where states 
have been unable to control their borders, provide the necessary public goods to its populations, 
or have broken down into complete violent conflict. The concept of state failure has been a hotly 
debated topic in the literature to the point where it may be described as an “essentially contested 
concept.”8 Scholars have vehemently disagreed on the appropriateness of the concept of state 
failure, the correct method of identifying states at risk of failing, and the problems and security 
threats associated with the occurrence of state failure, prompting the question of whether the 
concept of state failure needs to be refined in its definition and measurement (Newman, 2009) or 
if the concept should be abandoned and replaced with a new theoretical model entirely (Call, 
                                                 
8. An essentially contested concept has been defined as concepts that “inevitably involve endless disputes 
about their proper uses on the part of their users” (Boromisza-Habashi, 2010; Collier et al, 2006; Dollar et al, 2006; 
Gallie, 1955). 
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2008). Reviewing the literature on state failure, we shall see how this concept has been presented 
in a very disharmonious manner that has prevented a strong universal conceptualization of failed 
states to be developed. The following sections shall review the different perspectives on state 
failure, including the multiple definitions, conceptualizations, and theories on the causes and 
processes of state failure 
Definitions and Conceptualizations of State Failure 
The literature on state failure has produced multiple definitions and conceptualizations of 
state failure and its corresponding concept of failed states. Since the first identification of the 
concept of state failure (Helman and Ratner, 1992/93), there has been no overarching agreement 
between scholars on what the concept of state failure entails or which states should be considered 
failed or not; yet the recognition of the occurrence of state failure in nation-states continues to be 
discussed in the literature (Coggins, 2014; Howard, 2014; Loubser and Solomon, 2014). The 
contention in the literature has led to a disharmony and a lack of coherence over the concept of 
state failure. An example of this disharmony can be seen with the preferred use of terminology in 
the work dealing with failed states. Scholars have used different labels to describe these types of 
states, including ‘quasi-states’ (Jackson, 1990), ‘weak states’ (Gurses and Mason, 2010; Rice and 
Patrick, 2008), ‘fragile states’ (Brock et al, 2012), collapsed states’ (Zartman, 1995), and ‘failed 
states’ (Bates, 2008a; Howard, 2010b; Rotberg, 2003; 2004). Note that each of these different 
terms have been used to identify the same type of states,9 and at times have been used 
synonymously within the work of the same scholar.10  
                                                 
 9. The term failed state has been the most prominent label to describe this political phenomenon in 
academia as well as in the mainstream public discourse, though recent trends have shown a preference for the term 
“fragile state” in the literature. Some scholars have used these different terms to illustrate the level of severity a state 
suffers regarding state failure. For example, Rotberg lists states in the order of weak, failing, failed, collapsed. 
 10. For example, Patrick has used the labels ‘weak,’ ‘fragile,’ and ‘failing’ states individually in three 
separate analyses (2006; 2007; Patrick and Brown, 2006).  
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Looking at the attempts to define state failure, one can see a wide range of disagreements 
between scholars on the actual meaning of when a state has failed. As one astute scholar 
explains: “State failure is like obscenity: hard to define but you know it when you see it” 
(Campbell, 2011: 137). The difficulty with defining state failure is accurate, and while there has 
been no agreed upon definition of state failure, policymakers and the media have fully embraced 
the concept of state failure existing in the world (even if they do not truly understand what the 
concept really entails).11 The primary differences in the definitions of state failure has revolved 
around the role of the state, as either as a relationship between the state and the governed, or as a 
set of institutions that regulate the behavior and actions of a population.  
A widely-accepted definition of state failure comes from Rotberg, who defines failed 
states as those whose governments have lost the legitimacy or credibility to rule over most of 
their territory or people (2003). Rotberg’s definition of state failure is best characterized as a 
“citizen-based” view, where the relationship between the government and its population is the 
defining judgment on the functionality of the state. Rotberg’s citizen-based view may be 
compared to Zartman’s institutional-based perspective on state failure, where state failure is 
defined as “the situation where the [state] structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and 
political order have fallen apart” (1995). Under this view, the absence of power within the state’s 
institutions defines the collapse of the state. The citizen and institutional-based definitional 
approaches towards state failure are the foundations for many scholars’ explanations of the 
causes of state failure as well as their proposed solutions regarding failed states (Bates, 2008a; 
2008b; Ghani and Lockart, 2008; Howard, 2010a; Kasfir, 2004).  
                                                 
 11. For example, see Krever’s article on the United States Government shutdown in the fall of 2013 (2013).  
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While both perspectives on state failure have been presented as contending theories on 
the causes and problems with failed states, many scholars have identified a link between weak 
institutions and citizen-state deficiencies. Studies have found that failing institutions tend to be 
the result of a corrupted government that cannot or chooses not to provide public services and 
goods its citizens require (Khadiagala, 1995; Ng’ethe, 1995). Scholars have picked up on this 
link and have attempted to define state failure around how states perform or govern. Patrick 
demonstrates the applicability of both the citizen and institutional-based approaches to judging 
states by dividing them into four different categories, represented in a matrix of institutional 
capacity and functional willingness of state governing (see Table 3) (2006). The left-side of the 
matrix (quadrants {A} and {B}) represent states that have different levels of institutional 
capacity, but have high levels of willingness from the state to meet its functional purpose. 
Willingness may be interpreted as having “good governance,” or little corruption within the 
political authority. States included in these categories include moderate to highlight performing 
developing states, such as Botswana and Senegal, as well as weak states that exhibit the 
willingness to exercise good governance standards, including states such as Mali and 
Mozambique. For Patrick, state failure consists of states that are found on the right-side of the 
matrix (quadrants {C} and {D}), as these states, no matter what their institutional capacity is, 
have little willingness to function correctly regarding statehood. These include corrupt states that 
are unresponsive to the needs of all their people, such as Myanmar and Zimbabwe, and the states 
that are both weak institutionally and along measures of governance, such as the DRC and 
Somalia.  
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Table 3. Dimensions of Failed States- Capacity and Will 
  
Other scholars have also included the institutional and citizen-based approaches in their 
definitions of failed states, while also expanding on what it means to be a state. Milliken and 
Krause include both the institutional functionality and citizen-state relationship in their 
explanation of state failure, while also expanding the definitional parameters of state failure to 
include the role of the state in the nation-state system (2002). According to Milliken and Krause, 
states should be judged not only by how their institutions perform regarding the standards needed 
for stability inside the state, but also on whether a state is meeting its function or purpose as a 
sovereign political power in the nation-state system. This broadening of the definitional criteria 
of state failure has also allowed for more abstract notions of state failure, such as that of 
Chomsky who identifies the United States as a failed state because it has failed to meet its 
functional purpose for its increasing democratic deficit and for turning away from international 
norms and domestic liberties with its role in carrying out the Global War on Terror (2006).  
The Characteristics of States Experiencing Failure 
Consistent with the problems inherent to defining state failure, identifying the 
characteristics of the types of states symptomatic of failure has been equally challenging to 
scholars. The Political Instability Task Force (PITF),12 was among the first to identify the 
                                                 
 12. Formerly the State Failure Task Force. Originally a Central Intelligence Agency funded task force of 
researchers and methodologists whose task was to assess the vulnerability of states of experiencing political 
instability and state failure through predictive quantitative models (Political Instability Task Force, 2012).  
(Source: Patrick, 2006: 30) 
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characteristics of a state experiencing failure around the occurrence of violence in the state. The 
PITF identifies four specific types of violent conflict as an indicator of state failure, including: 
revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime changes, and genocides and politicides 
(Goldstone et al, 2010). The PITF’s conceptualization of state failure does not distinguish 
between the severity of conflict in states, as it identifies all states that experience one of the four 
types of conflict listed, as a failed state. A result of this conceptualization has been a broad 
population of failed states in the world, even if these states suffer from different levels of 
conflict.  
The inability for the PITF’s conceptualization to distinguish the differences between 
failed states has led other scholars to develop a concept of failed states around a concept of 
severity that is broader than the existence of violence. Rotberg argues that while failed states 
may be described as “tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and bitterly contested by warring 
factions” (2002), “violence alone does not condition failure, and the absence of violence does not 
necessarily imply that the state in question is unfailed” (2003). Rotberg’s conceptualization of 
failed states follows his focus on the citizen-state relationship, as failed states are identified 
around the amount of public goods a state can provide to its population. There are several public 
goods that states are viewed as being responsible to provide. These include security from 
external and internal threats of violence, the rule of law for the protection of private property and 
the proper abdication of disputes through a fair judicial system, an inclusive political process, 
public health care, access to education, infrastructure to facilitate economic activity and 
commerce, economic institutions for the regulation and promotion of economic opportunity, 
fostering a civil society, and developing a means for the sharing of common environmental 
resources (Rotberg, 2003). Rotberg lists these public goods in a hierarchical order, with security 
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at the top of the hierarchy and a necessity for all the other public goods to be provided (2003). 
For Rotberg, a failed state is identified as a state that is unable or unwilling to provide an 
adequate distribution of public goods to its population. This conceptualization of the 
characteristics of a failed state is similar to a deliberating medical condition, where affected 
states may suffer from a variety of symptoms that may weaken or completely inhibit a state from 
performing its core functions (Ellis, 2005). These symptoms of state failure include issues such 
as ongoing rebellions or insurgencies, poor economic development, and low levels of human 
development. A list of these characteristics, or symptoms, of state failure are provided in Table 
4. Apparent failed states may not suffer from all characteristics listed, but any identified failed 
state would show signs of a combination of these deficiencies.  
 
Table 4. Characteristics of Failed States 
           
(Source: Rotberg, 2002b) 
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  Some scholars have found fault in Rotberg’s conceptualization of failed states just as 
some have challenged the PITF’s conceptualization. Howard argues that the complexity of failed 
states is not accounted for in either of the PITF or Rotberg conceptualizations, as both the PITF 
and Rotberg mischaracterize certain states as being failed when they are not, and vice versa 
(Howard, 2010b). To account for the complexity of state failure, Howard combines the 
theoretical foundations of the function of the state from Rotberg with the methodological 
approach of the PITF. Howard identifies failed states by focusing on the severity of conflict 
within a state, where states that experience no conflict are identified as stable, or not failed, while 
states that experience at least one violent conflict are viewed as failing. Any state that 
experiences more than one violent conflict is identified as failed.  
These methods of conceptualizing the characteristics of failed states around these various 
issues has been criticized for presenting a “one-size fits all” model when considering state failure 
(Call, 2008; Patrick, 2007). Many scholars have attempted to classify failed states around 
different types of taxonomies to account for their diversity. Gros focuses on the level of authority 
in failed states, designating failed states in the categories of anarchic, phantom/mirage, anemic, 
captured, and aborted states (1996).13 Gros’ taxonomy excludes many poor functioning states 
from being considered as failed, as these states still present a significant level of authority in the 
state. This includes states such as North Korea which maintains a firm level of authority, but 
suffers from serious deficiencies with regards to its human right s abuses, extreme levels of 
poverty and starvation, and its isolation from most of the world. To account for these types of 
                                                 
13. Gros’ taxonomy of failed states, the anarchic state include states that lack any authority over its 
territory, the phantom/mirage state include states that have a small semblance of a central government, the anemic 
state include states in situations where the authority and legitimacy of the state are being drained by ongoing 
insurgencies and the problems associated with unchecked population growth, the captured state include states that 
have their central authority held by vulnerable elites that are consistently challenged for control, and the aborted 
state includes states that have failed before the process of state formation was consolidated (1996).  
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poor functioning states, other scholars have broadened the conceptualization of the 
characteristics of failed states to include how states govern their territory. Call includes the 
category of authoritarian states for their repressive nature as a form of state failure (2008).14  
To provide a more detailed approached in categorizing failed states, Patrick focuses on 
the political and economic situations in which the individual failed states are found in (2011). 
Patrick separates failed states into three categories with multiple sub-categories under each 
situation. The first category for failed states is the Improving Situations category, which includes 
states that are in the process of post-conflict recovery or are experiencing a democratic transition. 
The next category is the Deteriorating Situations, which includes conflict-ridden states and states 
that are experiencing prolonged political crises. The final category is the Chronic Situations 
category, which include collapsed states, endemically weak states, and poor performing resource-
rich states. From this conceptualization, one can identify the characteristics of failed states as 
well as introduce a measure of severity into any analysis to make comparisons between states 
and various stages of decline and failure.  
Process of State Failure  
To better understand the process of state failure, or rather how states fail, some scholars 
have avoided separating failed states into specific categories and have instead organized states 
around a broad concept of state strength. Rotberg includes all states in his characterization of 
state failure, ignoring the specific situations that failed states face, organizing states based upon 
the overall functioning capacity of the state. By organizing states based off capacity to govern, 
                                                 
14. Call categorizes failed states around four individual categories, including: Collapsed States, where no 
functioning political authority exists; Weak States, where the political authority is severely limited in meeting the 
needs of its people; War-torn States, where the authority employs repressive tactics to ward-off or defeat rebel 
forces; and Authoritarian States, where the core of the state’s functionality is based around oppression and control 
through violence (2008). Call argues for not using the term state failure when describing weak and failing states as 
well, as it is too broad of a concept when studying weak and fragile states.  
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Rotberg is able to divide states along a continuum of state stability, grading states along the lines 
of state strength (see Figure 2) (Rotberg, 2003).  
 
Figure 2. Rotberg’s State Stability Continuum 
          
According to Rotberg’s method of organizing states, strong states are states with a high 
capacity in providing public goods to their citizens, control almost all their territory, and perform 
well according to economic, development, and democracy indicators (Rotberg, 2003). These 
states would include most of the world’s western democracies. The next grade of state stability is 
weak states, which include states that suffer from a deficiency in providing public goods and 
have some poor functionality regarding their authority. Weak states include a broad range of 
states whose weakness results from physical or fundamental economic constraints. They 
typically hold divisions in society over ethnic or religious lines with the potential for conflict; 
though not full-on civil war. Weak states also show signs of declining per capita GDP and other 
critical economic indicators, as well as high levels of corruption and disappearing democratic 
principles (Rotberg, 2003). Examples of weak states would include much of the developing 
world, especially found in Sub-Saharan Africa, Central and Latin America, and South Asia.  
For Rotberg, failed states, the next grade of states, are states that are “tense, deeply conflicted, 
dangerous, and contested bitterly by warring factions” (Rotberg, 2003). In failed states, there are 
ongoing conflicts from various challengers to the state and the government has become an 
oppressive political institution to quell any potential threat to the regime. The regimes of most 
(Source: Rotberg, 2003) 
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failed states prey on their own constituents and the oppressive and usually corrupt nature of the 
regime forces citizens to abandon their allegiance to the government and seek aid and services 
from non-state actors (Rotberg, 2003). Most of the worlds failed states are found in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, including states such as the Central Africa Republic, Sudan, and Chad. With the 
occurrence of the Arab Spring, many failed states have also emerged recently in the Middle East 
and North Africa, including Iraq, Libya, and Syria. The final grade of state stability is the 
collapsed state. Collapsed states are the extreme version of a failed state, where the government 
only exists in name-only. In a collapsed state, there is no functionality regarding the governance 
of the state. Public goods must be obtained through private sources and security is equated with 
the rule of the strong. Collapsed states in the world, currently include Somalia, the DRC, and 
South Sudan.  
Focusing on the conceptualizations of state failure that allow for states to be organized 
along this continuum, being placed between the two polar ends of stability and failed (or 
collapsed), one can chart out the trajectories which states take towards failure. The literature so 
far has presented three potential models of the state failure process. These include the Absolute 
Transition Approach, the Process Approach, and the Severity Stage Approach (See Figure 3). 
While each model provides an interesting perspective on the state failure process, they each 
present a very distinct view on what state failure represents.  
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Figure 3. State Failure Processes 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
 
  
The first model on the process of state failure, the Absolute Transition Approach (Howard 
2010b), looks at the occurrence of state failure as a single step approach, whereby a state, due to 
an internal or external factor, breaks down from a status of stability to a status of failure. This 
approach to the state failure process has been held by the PITF, which has identified any state 
that experiences one of its four designated types of conflict as undergoing a transition towards 
failure. A case example of this model can be seen with the recent occurrences in Libya and Syria, 
where the state moved from a position of moderate stability to a status of failure with its 
experiences of revolution and civil war during the “Arab Spring.” While this model provides a 
concise framework for state failure, it has also been criticized for its one-sided nature of 
categorizing all states, which experience some form of political disturbance as being failed 
(Bates, 2008a). 
(Source: Howard, 2010b) 
36 
 
 The second model, the Process Approach (Howard, 2010b), explains the process of state 
failure not as a single-step transition like the Absolute Transition Approach, but as a multi-step 
process in which states move along a trajectory from stable, to weak, to failing, to failed, and 
finally collapsed (Bah, 2012; Debiel and Klein, 2002; Howard, 2010b; Rotberg 2002a; 2003). 
The notion of stability and failure under this model is fluid, where states may move back and 
forth from a status of weak to failure with the occurrence of a political event. For example, under 
this model Liberia during its civil war moved from a status of weak and failing to failure and 
then back to a status of weak within a year due to outcomes of its civil war. This model allows 
for a greater understanding of the process of state failure, as it includes all states and not only 
failed states. As not all weak states fail, the Process Approach model can help understand and 
analyze the paths that non-failing states undergo. The process approach has its limitations as 
well, as it views every failed state to undergo the same trajectory and is unable to explain cases 
of failure that occurs in a severe single stage.  
 The third model, the Severity Stage Approach (Howard 2010b), addresses the limitations 
of both the Absolute Transition and the Process Approaches. Under this model, the transition 
from stability to failure may occur in the one stage process, called a “severe transition,” or 
through multiple stages found in the Process Approach (Howard, 2010). With this model, state 
failure analyses can account for the rapid breakdown of the state as well as the slow process of 
'state decay' that weakens states overtime to an eventual point of failure. Overall, the Severity 
Stage Approach (Howard 2010b) has so far been the strongest model for explaining state failure. 
While this model contains the strongest explanatory ability regarding the process of state failure, 
it is still limited, as with the others, in its ability to explain the cases of states that have avoided 
failure. To achieve the fullest understanding of the concept of state failure, a model of state 
37 
 
failure must be able to explain how some states arrive at a status of failure as well as how some 
states can avoid failure. So far, the literature on state failure has been unable to explain the 
process of state failure fully as well as provide an appropriate definition or conceptualization of 
state failure. Overall, the literature on state failure suffers from serious weaknesses in adequately 
explaining state failure. The following section will review some of these major weaknesses in the 
literature. 
Weaknesses of the State Failure Conceptualizations 
 The various assessments on state failure present the concept in a multitude of fashions, 
however none of these conceptualizations have presented a view of state failure that is consistent 
in identifying failing states. The lack of a strong foundation for the conceptualization of state 
failure has allowed for the entire concept of state failure to misrepresent the problems that states 
face, as well as allow observers to mischaracterize a state as failing without providing a 
comprehensive justification. This lack of understanding of state failure has allowed for scholars 
and commentators to apply the concept of state failure liberally without any consistency across 
the discipline. For example, recent commentaries have labeled Yemen (Brehony, 2011) and 
South Sudan (Loewenstein, 2015) as failed without identifying precise metrics for failure, while 
other commentaries have used the failed state label when discussing the political and social 
problems in Belgium (King, 2015) and the United States (Krever, 2013). While Belgium, South 
Sudan, the United States, and Yemen may each contain certain aspects associated with state 
failure in varying degrees, there is no unifying factor across these cases within the state failure 
concept that allows for this label to apply to all the aforementioned cases uniformly.  
This liberal application of the concept of state failure shows the weakness in the current 
conceptualizations of state failure. Reviewing these weaknesses will illustrate the need to 
38 
 
reconceptualize state failure into a more comprehensive and uniformly applicable concept.
 The first primary weakness with the conceptualization of state failure deals with how 
particular states are designated as being in a “state of failure” based upon a comparison between 
perceived stable states and failed states. The concept of stability is a problem when trying to 
identify failed states, as some states that suffer from severe economic, political, and humanitarian 
problems that are associated with state failure may also be inherently stable when considering 
their authoritarian systems. The concept of stability has not been fully clarified in the literature, 
allowing for some states to be identified as being stable and failed at the same time.  
 The second primary weakness with the conceptualization of state failure has been the 
inherent bias towards the developing world when considering failed states. The current analyses 
of failed states focus almost exclusively on comparisons between the economically developed 
global North versus the underdeveloped South. Table 5 compares the top ten states at risk of 
experiencing failure with the top ten states with the least risk of failure (i.e. stable states) from 
the 2016 Fragile State Index. All the top states ranked with the highest risk of failure come from 
the developing world and all the states identified with the least amount of risk come from the 
developed world. In this same index, thirty-one of the thirty-four OECD states are identified with 
the least amount of risk of failure, making them the most stable states. The first OECD state that 
is ranked on the at-risk side of the index is Turkey with a ranking of 79th15 and the first non-
OECD state with the lowest ranking based on risk of failure is Singapore at 161st.  
 
 
                                                 
 15. Excluding Israel/West Bank, which is ranked 69th. 
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Table 5. Comparison of Failed States vs. Stable States 
                 (Source: Fund for Peace, 2016) 
 
 The North/South bias found within the discourse on failed states has held an essence of 
orientalist/imperialist perspectives that have characterized failed states as wrong and in need of 
correction by the powers-that-be (Gruffydd Jones, 2013; Hill, 2005), allowing some 
constructivist scholars to argue that the concept of state failure as a threat to international 
security has been constructed to give developed states legitimacy to intervene in the political and 
economic institutions of weak and developing states (Halvorson, 2010). One can see this bias in 
the discourse, as it describes failed states as deviants with an allusion of “otherness” compared to 
the developed world (Morton, 2005). Examples of this mischaracterization of failed states are 
abundant in the literature, such as Kaplan’s extolled work, “The Coming Anarchy,” which 
presents West Africa as an anarchic society ruled by unruly violent mobs (1994).16  
                                                 
 16. Kaplan writes “The cities of West Africa at night are some of the unsafest places in the world. Streets 
are unlit; the police often lack gasoline for their vehicles; armed burglars, carjackers, and muggers proliferate” 
(1994).  
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 A general problem with the bias found in the state failure literature is the nominal 
analyses used when judging states. When authoritarian states are labeled as failed because of 
their oppressive ways, even if they meet the standards of statehood defined by the international 
community, it has been a value-judgment that has designated that state as failed because of its 
regime type and not because of the overall capacity or functionality of the state.  
  A final weakness within the literature on the conceptualization of state failure has been 
the inability for scholars to accurately explain the process of failure that can account for cases of 
states which have avoided failure and improved their internal stability. The three models on the 
process of failure (the Absolute Transition Approach, the Process Approach, and the Severity 
Stage Approach) are all one-directional. States only move the other direction on the continuum 
after they have failed and begun rebuilding their institutions. Looking at the data on state failure, 
one can see multiple improving transitions occurring that involve states moving away from 
failure without failing. Few studies have so far looked at states that have avoided failure and 
improved their internal conditions (Chauvet and Collier, 2008; Chesterman et al, 2008; François 
and Sud, 2006; Ghani and Lockhart; 2009; Mills, 2014). Little research has tested any preventive 
aspects towards state failure through statistical models,17 relying more on qualitative case studies 
of states that have avoided failure. Although this is important work, the absence of empirical 
research on this phenomenon inhibits arriving at a comprehensive understanding of the entire 
process of state behavior, and not just state failure. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 17. Chauvet and Collier being the exception (2008).  
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Conclusion: A Need for a New Conceptualization of State Behavior 
 The literature on state failure has so far been insufficient in explaining failed states. To 
improve the deficiencies in the literature, a new conceptualization on failed states and a model on 
state failure must be developed that accounts for all types of failed states as well as all potential 
trajectories that states may take towards and away from a status of failure. The following chapter 
will propose a new conception of state failure based around how states meet their obligations to 
their citizens. A refined model of state failure will be proposed, called the Significant-Transition 
Approach, which will explain state failure as a fluid process where states may move towards or 
away from failure with a change in how states meet their obligation to their citizens.  
  
42 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
A THEORY OF STATE BEHAVIOR 
The previous chapter reviewed several weaknesses associated with the concept of state 
failure. While the overall concept of state failure has been shown to be highly problematic, it is 
the opinion of this study that the concept still provides a utility towards the understanding of the 
proper functionality of states. To achieve greater utility of the concept of state failure, this study 
will develop a new definition and conceptualization of state behavior that provides an analytic 
model to identify the determinants of both success and failure of states. With this comprehensive 
approach to state behavior, this study will demonstrate the utility of focusing on a state’s 
obligation when evaluating the causes of state failure and state success.  
A New Understanding of State Failure 
  As the current interpretations of state failure have shown to be inadequate, a new 
understanding of state failure is required. The following sections will propose a new 
understanding towards state failure, providing an original definitional and conceptual 
interpretation as well as a modified outlook regarding the process in which fragile states 
transition to and from a status of failure. Focusing on the role the state plays as the authoritative 
leader over a defined populace, this study shall advance a view of state behavior that examines 
the ability of states to meet their recognized obligations in a contemporary sense of statehood. 
This new interpretation of state failure will allow for greater agreement over the designation of 
states as failed or not, as well as provide a more reliable methodological approach, than that of 
value-judgements, to assessing and evaluating failed states.  
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Redefining State Failure and State Success 
 One of the major weaknesses in the literature on state failure has been the lack of a 
comprehensible definition that provides an accurate and universally agreed upon depiction of 
failed states. The primary definitions of state failure given in the literature tend to present only a 
portion of the problems faced by failed states by focusing on deficiencies within a single aspect 
of statehood, such as the loss of legitimacy (Rotberg, 2003) or the loss of authority (Zartman, 
1995). These definitional approaches provide a narrow view of failure, ignoring the full range of 
failed states and creating disputes over which states should be identified as failed or not 
(Howard, 2010b). To avoid the disagreements over identified failed states, a definition of state 
failure is required that provides a robust and easily applied definition around the core functional 
principles and purposes of the state. 
Focusing on the role of the state, this study shall promote a definition of state failure that 
looks at the relationship the state has with its public. State failure shall be defined as the failure 
of the state in meeting its obligations as the legitimate political authority over a defined 
population; with its obligations focusing on providing the necessary public goods and services 
required for a population to develop socially, culturally, and economically. This definition is 
similar to Rotberg’s view on the role of state in providing certain public goods, with failed states 
neglecting to provide these goods (2003). For this study, these necessary public goods and 
services is derived from our modern sense of statehood today, where the state is deemed 
responsible for providing goods such as security from violence, civil justice and the rule of law, a 
decent standard of living, education, health care, economic opportunity, and general political and 
social equality.  
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 Relying on this new focus of state obligations as the foundation for the conceptualization 
of state failure, this study can develop a new definition to state success that also focuses on the 
aspect of the proper functionality of states. State success shall be defined as the success of the 
state in meeting its obligations as the legitimate political authority over a defined population. 
With this definition, states are not judged as being successful for simply not failing or for their 
economic or military prowess, but now are judged off how they operate regarding the expected 
obligations on them. A stable state is not identified as being successful for its low fragility level, 
but instead is identified successful for its proper behavior of meeting its expectations that creates 
this low fragility level. By focusing on the behavior of states with regards to how they choose to 
meet their obligations or not, a stronger conceptualization of state success will allow for an even 
greater understanding of state failure and its causes.      
This definition of state failure and state success has a limited application when one 
considers the aspect of time. One criticism of the concept of state failure has been its relativity 
when one considers the different expectations of states since their establishment in the 17th 
century. The standards of which states are assessed are not static principles, but instead 
expectations that are relative to the perceived notion of how states are expected to operate at the 
time of their assessment (Carment, 2003).  This relativity creates several problems towards the 
conceptualization of failed and successful states, as what may be viewed as a proper functioning 
state today may be viewed as failing in the future based on the changing expectations society has 
towards the state. This study is promoting a view of the state under our current expectations of 
states in the contemporary era. The obligations that are expected of states are based around the 
defining principles of our current expectations of states today. For the current assessment of 
states, the basis of their expected obligations needs to come from current widespread agreement 
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on the purpose and function of states. In future assessments, if the expectations of states have 
changed, then new collectively agreed upon standards of the state should be relied upon when 
evaluating how states meet their expected obligations.18 
As there exists the potential for disagreements over what should be considered as 
expected obligations of the state, this study shall promote the identified rights and obligations of 
the state listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (henceforth referred as the 
Declaration) as the basis for state functionality today. The Declaration serves as the most 
universally agreed upon principles of the purpose on operate of states currently, and provides 
listed expectations for how states should interact with their populations. Since its passage in 
1948, the Declaration has served as the basis of internal human rights law (United Nations 
General Assembly, 1948b). While not actually codified as law, the Declaration serves as a 
representation of “clear standards that can serve as a basis for discussions across ideological and 
cultural divides” (Glendon, 2002: xix). Although, criticism of the Declaration as being 
culturally-biased against non-western civilizations, may hamper its utility in defining state 
functionality (Hassan, 1995), these criticisms can be accounted for if we take the Declaration for 
its intended role as a framework for what nation-states should aim to achieve in how they interact 
with their populations and not an actual list of rights that states must abide by. Given that there is 
little disagreement regarding respect for human dignity (Donnelly, 1982), the use of the 
Declaration as the foundation for defining the obligations of the state may be viewed as an 
acceptable practice.  
While other international agreements and treaties may appear to serve better for assessing 
state actions, the Declaration is viewed as being the best framework for assessing the proper role 
                                                 
18. It is the assumption that the expectations of states will only increase in the future and not lessen from 
our current view on the obligations of states.  
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and function of states in the contemporary era. Although the Declaration is not an actual treaty, 
so not enforceable when states choose not to follow its declarations on citizen rights, it is the 
opinion of this study that the Declaration serves as what states should aim to achieve with 
regards to how they interact with their populace. In the Declaration, the listed rights are being 
declared by the international community as being universal, and thus above the particular 
cultures and politics of individual states. When the Declaration was passed in the aftermath of 
the Second World War, many states, including developed states such as the United States and in 
Western Europe, were not in compliance with the standards set by the Declaration. One should 
not interpret the Declaration as faulty based off this fact. Its lack of enforcement is not a 
weakness, as the Declaration was never intended to serve as a legal framework, but more a of a 
political framework for the proper functionality of states.    
The Declaration serves as a model for what is viewed to be the proper role of the state 
with regards to its people. Within the context of these individual rights, we may transpose certain 
public goods and services that are required by states to provide if they are to fulfill and respect 
the rights of their populace. Some of these goods include an inclusive government (Article 21), a 
sufficient standard of living (Article 25), and access to education at the minimum of the primary 
level (Article 26).19 With this derivation of public goods and services within the context of 
protecting individual human rights, the concept of state failure can be developed around whether 
states meet their obligations in providing these goods and services, or if they fail in their duties in 
providing them. We may presuppose that functioning, and thus successful, states provide these 
public goods and services to their populace. States that cannot or choose not to provide these 
goods and services are assumed to be failing in their roles as political authorities.  
                                                 
19. A completed copy of the Declaration is provided in Appendix 1.  
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Given that the state’s obligation to its public is robustly linked to the state’s core 
foundation of authority, legitimacy, and sovereignty, the failure of the state to meet these 
obligations weaken the state in all three aspects of statehood. Figure 4 illustrates the relationship 
that the obligations of the state have on the aspects of statehood. The state may lose some of its 
authority when its public must seek out necessary goods and services from private and external 
forces when the state cannot provide them. The state may also have its legitimacy challenged, as 
the people may see the state as unfit to rule due to their failure to live up to their obligations 
towards their public. The state’s sovereignty will also be challenged if external powers must 
intervene and support the state in providing certain goods and services. These effects to the 
aspects of statehood resemble the occurrence of state failure, as challenges to the state from 
internal and external forces begin to emerge as well as grievances and resentment emerge within 
the public as they compete over resources and power due to the absence of the state.  
 
Figure 4. Effects of Broken State Obligations on the Aspects of Statehood 
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As this study contends that state failure is the result of states not meeting their necessary 
obligations, this study will focus on specific obligations of the state derived from the Declaration 
that ensure the safety and development of individuals. As certain obligations are more significant 
than others regarding the need to provide the public opportunities for success, this 
conceptualization divides state obligations into three separate levels. Each of these sets of 
obligations represents core responsibilities of states, organized in a hierarchical order similar to 
Rotberg’s concept of the state (2003).  
In the first set of obligations, labeled as “Tier I Obligations,” states are required to 
provide the primary public good necessary for the existence of the state. This level of obligation 
includes the most important good of security from violence from non-state actors and external 
powers. States that cannot provide this public good have short life spans, they tend to be 
challenged from internal and external threats and will be unable to consistently stop these 
challenges to their authority. The notion of security applies to the state and the people. While the 
state needs to be concerned about challenges to its authority, it also needs to be concerned with 
the potential violence that its people are susceptible to. This includes violence from war, civil 
strife, and general crime in society. Ongoing violence within the state also forces the citizens of 
the state to seek protection from private forces or refuge outside the state. Without meeting this 
obligation, the state is extremely hindered from providing any lower level of public goods, 
further weakening a state’s authority and legitimacy in the eyes of their public. States such as 
Somalia, the DRC, and South Sudan can be viewed failing to fulfill this obligation with violence 
occurring regularly in these states with little relief from the state to protect their citizens. The 
humanitarian crises that have resulted in these cases illustrate the clear negative effects from 
states that fail at this level of obligation. Several of the rights from the Declaration can be found 
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under this level of obligation when we consider the rights of an individual from private and 
government forces. See Table 6 for a list of rights from the Declaration that fall under the 
obligation of security for states.  
The next level of obligation, “Tier II Obligations,” consist of public goods next in the 
hierarchical order. This level of obligation includes the political and judicial institutions and 
procedures that define how a state governs. These obligations include the essence of the rule of 
law for the state to follow and some form of government accountability through an open political 
process. These obligations allow for the adjudication of conflicts between individuals, while also 
promoting an essence of fairness in the legal and political system. While they are not as 
important as the obligation of providing security, they do play an important role for the proper 
behavior of states. By not fulfilling these obligations, states allow corruption and political 
grievances to emerge within society that will weaken the public’s trust in the state to be a fair 
and just authority. A prime example of state that failed to meet this obligation is the state of Zaire 
(now the DRC) under the rule of Mobutu Sese Seko, where rampant corruption led to the lack of 
support of the state, aiding in its downfall. The Declaration contains many rights that fall under 
this level of obligation for states (See Table 6 for a list of these rights).  
The final level of obligation, “Tier III,” consist of the goods and services that aids in the 
economic, political, and social development of their populations. These include access to medical 
and health care, education, economic opportunity, a decent standard of living, civil society, and 
social equality. The obligations under the Tier III level, while important for economic growth and 
stability within a state, are not required to prevent the complete collapse of a state. Their absence 
does create many negative effects for a state, as the lack of providing these goods by the state 
weakens the relationship between the people and the state. Without these goods, a state’s 
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populace may not view the state in a positive light as a provider, but more as a repressive force 
that does not meet the needs of the people. Many developing states fall under the category of 
failing to meet their Tier III obligations. The lack of fulfillment has stymied growth in these 
states, preventing them from improving their overall fragility levels. The remaining rights of the 
Declaration may be found under this level of obligation for states (See Table 6 for a list of these 
rights).20  
                                                 
20. Some of the public goods listed under the Tier III obligations may be provided by non-governmental 
organizations and international organizations. The provision of these goods by groups outside the state is still a clear 
sign of the poor functionality of the state. External organizations would not need to provide these goods if the state 
had the capacity or will to meet its obligations. This is not the case for internal NGOs that choose to provide these 
goods. For NGOs in the state, such as civil society groups and religious organizations that provide these public 
goods, there provision of certain goods is limited to their own resources. A state may choose to aid these groups by 
allowing their operation and providing financial or a legal framework for them to operate. These types of actions 
should be considered as part of the fulfillment of a state’s obligations. 
51 
 
Table 6. Tiers of State Obligation and their Corresponding Universal Human Rights 
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 The ordering of these tiers of obligations is based on their importance towards the 
functionality of the state. The first tier of security has obvious primacy, as its scarcity would 
threaten the existence of the state. High levels of government repression found under this tier 
also directly affect the level of fragility in state, as repression has been identified as a driver of 
violent conflict and rebellion (Lichbach, 1987; Moore, 1998). The second tier focuses on the 
manner of governance, as these obligations directly tie to the interaction the people have with the 
state based on the established rules and how the state decides to or to not follow them. Evidence 
shows how poor governance with experiences of corruption weaken the legitimacy of the state 
hamper the reciprocal support the people need to provide to the state (Seligson, 2002). The final 
tier deals with specific actions states take with the providing of certain tangible public goods that 
their people use and require for their development and livelihoods. Their absence does not 
guarantee the failure of states, but a state will find it very difficult to develop economically 
without them (Barro, 2013).21  
Building upon the conceptualization of state success and state failure, this study shall 
classify states as succeeding or failing states according to whether a state meets its several levels 
of expected obligations. States that are meeting their obligations in providing the necessary 
public goods and services are categorized as successful, whereas states that cannot or choose not 
to provide these necessary public goods and services are categorized as failing. By focusing 
                                                 
21. There are certain costs with providing these goods that, at times, some weak or fragile states may weigh 
against one another and overlook the providing of them to meet more pressing obligations. The decision to provide 
these goods is still a choice of behavior made by the state. The assessment of state failure promoted here is based on 
how states function correctly, which is focused on how states choose to behave. While a state may forgo meeting 
one of its obligations to fulfill another, such as suspending the constitutional limits placed on it in order to create 
more security in the state (and this action may be considered to be the most appropriate action given the situation the 
state is in), this action is still going against the proper functionality of the state and the state should be assessed on its 
failure to meet its obligations for it. Good preforming states will rectify the situation they are in as soon as possible 
and return to successfully meeting its obligations in the hierarchical order, where poor preforming states will remain 
in a status of failing in meeting its obligations. 
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exclusively on the functionality of states based on the recognized obligations they owe to their 
population, this method of conceptualization of state behavior avoids some of the major 
problems that current conceptualizations of state failure suffer from and provides a better 
approach to understanding why states may or may not fail. From this conceptualization of proper 
state behavior, there is the assumption that states which fail to meet their Tier I obligations have 
a very difficult time, if not an impossible task in meeting their Tier II and Tier III obligations and 
are most likely to experience a shift towards a failing status, whereas, states that meet their Tier I 
as well as their Tier II and/or eventually meet their Tier III obligations will more likely to find 
themselves in a position where their aspects of statehood are reinforced and improve their 
fragility to a point where it shifts them towards a status of success.  
Using this conceptualization as a diagnosis of states in the light of state failure, all states 
can be graded along the lines of whether they are succeeding or failing at the different levels of 
state obligation. Table 7 illustrates this new conceptualization of state failure by analyzing actual 
states based off their fulfillment of the different levels of state obligation. With the indicators 
provided in the analysis in Table 7, a sense may be derived on the nature of the relationship 
between the state and its public. The examples given in Table 7 indicate the success and failure 
of the state based upon its ability to meet the obligations at the Tier I, Tier II, and Tier III levels. 
The first state in this analysis, the advanced social welfare state of Denmark, shows signs of 
success at all levels of obligation. The state of Denmark maintains stable political institutions, 
effective and accountable government, and provides an array of public goods, including 
expanded access to education and social welfare. From this basic analysis, Denmark appears to 
fulfill all its obligations, which puts Denmark in a status of success as a state. The next state, 
Eritrea, presents itself as the opposite regarding the meeting of its obligations, as it has a very 
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weak security apparatus that provides few public goods and has a poor human rights record. 
Based upon these accounts, Eritrea can be viewed as failing at all levels of state obligation. This 
would place Eritrea in a status of failure across all Tier levels, which puts Eritrea at high risk 
regarding its fragility level. The third state in the analysis, Botswana, represents a mixed result 
with respect to fulfilling its obligations. While Botswana has a weak security apparatus, it does 
produce a moderate level of public services and goods that should prevent it from being 
considered a complete failing state. From this analysis, Botswana may be considered to be 
succeeding at the Tier I level of obligation, and partially at the Tier II level, it still falls short of 
meeting its advanced obligations towards its public, and thus should be considered as failing at 
the Tier III. This rating would level, which puts it at moderate risk for failure. 
 
Table 7. Conceptualization of State Success and Failure with State Obligation Levels 
 
22 
                                                 
22. Data from the 2016 Fragile State Index (Fund for Peace, 2016). 
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A New Process of State Failure  
 The development of a new approach to understanding state failure requires a new 
interpretation of the process regarding how states either fail or succeed. Developing an 
understanding of this process is important, as any methodological analysis of state failure will 
need to focus on the process that states undergo to identify any significant relationships 
regarding the causes and deterrents of state failure. This study proposes a refined approach to the 
process of state failure, titled the Significant Transition Approach, that accounts for major shifts 
for states along a continuum of bipolar points of success and failure based on a state’s level of 
fragility or risk of failure. Under this refined approach, states are in a status of fluidity on this 
continuum and move closer to one of the opposing poles of success or failure when subject to 
internal or external pressure. The purpose of this new approach is to assess not the current status 
of states, but the trajectory states are on regarding to their functionality. By relying on this new 
approach, one may identify and analyze major shifts, labeled as a “significant transition,” to a 
state’s fragility level over an isolated period of time. Analyzing these shifts with help understand 
the concept of state failure and its causes. 
 This refined model on the process of state failure is depicted in Figure 5. This figure 
shows two directions that states may follow along on the continuum of success and failure, with 
State X representing states that have seen their conditions worsen and move closer to a status of 
failure and State Y representing states that have experienced an improvement to their overall 
functionality and have moved closer to the opposing pole of success. State X’s worsening 
situation is designated as a “failing transition,” as it has moved from a better position on the 
continuum to a worse position. State Y has undergone a “successful transition,” as it is improved 
its position along the continuum. This representation of successful and failing transitions is 
56 
 
intended to illustrate what is occurring with states regarding the overall status of their 
functionality.  
Figure 5. The Significant Transition Approach to State Functionality 
  
Looking at recent data (FSI, 2016) on state fragility, many states can be observed as 
experiencing both successful and failing transitions. Measuring changes to a state’s level of 
fragility risk over the past ten years shows ninety-three states experiencing either a successful or 
failing transition at a noticeable level.23 These states consist of states at all levels of 
development, with different types of government, economic capability, and fragility risk. These 
types of shifts in state fragility are not a regular occurrence for all states, as during this same 
timeframe eighty-eight states experienced no significant changes to their fragility level.24 Of the 
states that have experienced a noticeable shift in fragility, fifty-four states have experienced a 
successful transition in reducing their fragility level and thirty-nine states have experienced a 
failing transition towards a greater risk of state failure. Of these two groups of states, a distinct 
group of states have experienced a significant change to their level of fragility with a change of 
ten points or more to their fragility risk. In this group, twenty-eight states have seen a change in 
                                                 
23. Data has been collected from the Fund for Peace’s Fragile State Index, measuring the difference in FSI 
scores from the 2006 survey and 2016 survey. A noticeable level is defined as a change of five points or more (an 
increase or decrease) to a state’s FSI score (Fund for Peace, 2016).  
24. For a list of states and the level of transition they have experienced, please see Appendix 2.  
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their fragility score by ten points or more, with an even split of fourteen states each experiencing 
a successful and a failing shift in their fragility level. Table 8 lists the states experiencing these 
perceived significant transitions.  
Table 8. States Experiencing Significant Successful and Failing Transitions, 2005-2015  
  
Examining the states listed in Table 8, there is a diversity of states when considering their 
economic, social, political, and geographical characteristics. The states experiencing failing 
transitions share some similarities, with a majority of them coming from Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Many of these failing transition states are also suffering from the effects of recently concluded or 
ongoing civil wars (including the Central African Republic, Libya, Mali, Syria, and Yemen). 
Besides violent conflict driving increases to fragility, economic pressures have also had a major 
influence on some of these states. Greece, the only state from Europe that has experienced this 
level of fragility shift, continues to suffer from its budgetary deficiencies, weakening the 
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capability of the state. Weak and corrupt political institutions also appear in many of these states, 
also contributing to their declining situations. 
 There are many possible theories for these states have suffered significant increases to 
their level of fragility. These include the colonial histories of these states (Mayall, 2005). Many 
states, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, continue to suffer from the problems associated with the 
poor state-building that occurred under colonialism and after their independence (Herbst 2012; 
2014). Other theories include critical theories on economic relations, such as world systems 
theory (Wade, 2005) and neopatrimonialism (Hill, 2009). While there may exist some merit 
behind these arguments, as well as criticisms for their misinterpretation of the problems and 
causes of state failure (Wai, 2012), these theories cannot completely explain the opposing 
occurrence of states decreasing their level of fragility. States on the other end of the spectrum 
that have transitioned towards a path of success based off changes to their fragility level appear 
to be much more diverse than their opposing failing states. These states come from all over the 
world, including Western and Eastern Europe, South and Central America, Asia, and Sub-
Saharan Africa, indicating that successful shifts in fragility are not regionally biased against the 
developing world. Some of these states lack colonial histories while others experienced similar 
histories and paths to development that many failing states have. These states have different roles 
in the global economy as well, questioning the application of the economic theories for success 
of states.  These states are also very diverse in their level of economic development and 
capability, type of governance, populations, and culture, further questioning why has caused their 
positive change to their fragility. Table 9 compares these states based upon their economic, 
political, regional characteristics. 
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Table 9. Comparison of States Experiencing a Significant Successful Transition, 2005-2015 
 
The differences between these states make it uncertain as to the determinants of 
successful shifts in state fragility, especially at this level. There are vast differences between a 
state such as Germany, a highly advanced economic and political state, and Cuba, a politically 
repressive state with a limited economic capability. Cuba, nonetheless, has experienced the 
largest shift among all the states based upon the changes in its fragility risk (15.60 difference 
between the 2006 and 2016 FSI surveys). A simple answer of improved economies or a decline 
in violent conflict is not sufficient to explain why these states have been able to succeed. It is the 
opinion of this study that an answer to why states succeed and reduce their level fragility is tied 
directly to their behavior and whether they choose to fulfill the obligations that are owed to the 
populace of states. A closer examination of how states complete these obligations and the 
changes in their fragility levels may shed some light on to the correct answer to why states 
succeed. 
(Sources: CIA World Fact Book, 2016; United Nations Development Programme, 2016; World Bank, 2016) 
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Testing this hypothesized explanation to the occurrence of state success and failure, the 
cases of Columbia and Syria and their recent opposing shifts in fragility risks may be assessed 
along the lines of their fulfillment of the different tiers of obligations. Figure 6. illustrates the 
shifts both states have undergone through the application of the significant transition approach. 
One can see how Syria, because of its ongoing civil war, has moved significantly towards failure 
over this ten-year period. Columbia, in contrast, has made a significant successful transition in 
the same time-period, as its decades long internal conflict with the FARC insurgency has come 
to an end with a potential peace treaty. Applying the theory of state-obligation, we may assess 
that Syria is experiencing a failing transition, as its civil war has denied many of its people the 
required goods expected to be provided by the state, including security from violence, basic food 
necessities, healthcare, and basic rights. Columbia has experienced the opposite trend, as it has 
been succeeding with the improvements to its security. With this increase in security, the 
Columbian state has been able to expand the level of public goods it offers to its people.  
 
Figure 6. The Significant Transition Approach to State Functionality25 
 
 
                                                 
25. The data on the functionality of Syria and Columbia comes from the 2006 and 2016 Fragile State Index 
surveys (Fund for Peace, 2016). 
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It is important to highlight that this assessment does not consider the existence or non-
existence of violence as the cause for these states to transition along the continuum. The 
changing levels of violence for these two cases are only effects from the fulfillment or neglect of 
these states’ obligations. Syria may be considered to be a failed state as a result of its civil war, 
which is a result of its failure to meet its Tier I obligation of security, but the violence from this 
civil war did not start its transition towards a position of failure. The Syrian Regime’s failure to 
provide adequate support to a sector of its population allowed for resentment and discontent to 
spread within its population against the state (Wendle, 2015). Columbia, in comparison, has 
shown success for its ability to provide the necessary goods to its public. The end of the conflict 
with the FARC will aid in improving security in Columbia, but cannot be claimed as the cause 
for Columbia’s success. The conflict with the FARC has been isolated in Columbia and waning 
for the past two decades, with the Columbian government not experiencing a significant violent 
attack since the early 2000’s (Center for Systemic Peace, 2016). This negates the claim that 
conflict is a determining factor of success or failure for states. The provision of public goods and 
meeting one’s obligations influences the occurrence of success or failure for states. 
Conclusion 
The new approach to state failure and state success provided in this chapter shows how 
the consideration of the obligations of the state serve as a potential strong indicator for state 
functionality. Basing the evaluation of states off their fulfillment of the requirements laid out in 
the Declaration adds a new and important aspect to the consideration of state behavior, where 
states may be better judged and held accountable for their failings in the modern sense of 
statehood. The development of the significant transition approach also provides a new analytical 
approach to assessing the capability of states and the level of risks they face with regards to state 
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failure. These additions to the discourse on state failure serve only as conjecture without their 
application to see whether they are a reliable method of analysis. To demonstrate the reliability 
of this refined conceptualization of state failure and to find any evidence that affirms the theory 
of state behavior as a viable explanation of state success, this study must implement a rigorous 
analysis that compares the level of state fragility against the fulfillment of the different levels of 
state obligation.  
The significant transition approach may be directly applied to a statistical analysis that 
can test hypothesized determinants of state failure and state success against actual occurrences of 
failing and successful transitions for states. Using a rigorous quantitative method, any evidence 
of the fulfillment of state obligations as an influencing factor behind state transitions may be 
revealed, providing verification of this refined conceptualization on state failure and confirm the 
importance of the state obligations regarding the successful behavior of states. The following 
chapter shall introduce a new recommended research design for the analytical study of state 
failure. With this design, this study shall run a quantitative analysis that will test the importance 
of the different levels of state obligation in influencing the occurrence of success or failure for 
states.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS 
The previous chapter introduced a revised conceptualization of state failure and a 
proposed theory on state behavior that places state obligation as the principle influence behind 
the occurrence of state success and failure. A cursory analysis revealed a potential relationship 
between the fulfillment of a state’s obligations and transitions for states with consideration of 
their fragility level. To demonstrate the validity behind the premise of the theory of state 
behavior that the fulfillment of state obligations is a significant factor behind the success of 
states, it will be required by this study to provide evidence of a causal relationship between these 
variables through an analytical model. Relying on the significant-transition approach research 
model presented in the previous chapter, this study shall implement a rigorous quantitative 
analysis that will test the relationship between the different levels of obligations a state meets in 
providing for its populace and the transitions of success and failure a state experiences based 
upon changes to its level of fragility risk. Using multinomial logit analyses of the Fund for Peace 
(2016) Failed State Index data, this study will test the impact of Tier I, Tier II, and Tier III 
obligations on a state’s probability or risk of failure or success for the years of 2006-2016. The 
following sections provide details on how this analysis of state success and state failure shall be 
undertaken, with an explanation of the methodology and a description of the variables and data. 
Following this explanation of the methods and data, the findings from the multiple logit analyses 
shall be presented and explained. 
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Research Design 
The purpose of this analysis will attempt to answer the question of why states succeed 
based upon whether the meeting of a state’s various obligations impact the level of fragility 
within a state. By testing whether fulfillment of these obligations correspond with the success or 
failure of states, measured by a decline or increase in a state’s fragility level, respectively, this 
study will be able to confirm the proposed theory of state-obligation’s impact on the occurrence 
of state success. Any significant findings from this analysis will aid in the development potential 
policies that may be used to help potential fragile states improve their current situations and find 
success. 
 This study will focus primarily on states that have shown signs of transitions of success 
and failure from 2005 to 2015. Using the significant transition approach model as a basis for this 
analysis, this study will track how all states have made shifts in their fragility level closer to 
either of the opposing poles on the success-failure continuum (see Figure 7). The research design 
for this study allows for two intensities of movement along the continuum, which can occur in 
both the directions of success and failure. The first intensity is considered as a “partial transition” 
towards success or failure. This type of movement occurs when the state has experienced a 
modest change to its fragility level. The second level of intensity is considered as a “significant 
transition” towards success or failure. This type of movement occurs when the state has 
experienced a major shift in its fragility level where its categorization of being stable, weak, 
fragile, or failed has elevated or descended to another level of category based off its fragility risk.  
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Figure 7. Success – Failure Continuum with Transition Intensities 
 
Focusing on the different levels of state obligations, this study contends that the 
completion of these obligations will significantly relate to the occurrences of successful 
transitions for states, with each level of obligation having a varying impact on the type of 
transition a state experiences. Correspondingly, this study also contends that the failure to meet 
these obligations is significantly related to the occurrences of failing transitions for states. 
Considering this viewpoint, this study proposes the following hypotheses: 
 
H1a) States that fail in meeting their overall Tier I obligations are more likely to 
experience a significant transition toward failing. 
 
H1b) States that successfully meet their overall Tier I and Tier II obligations but 
fail to meet their Tier III obligations are more likely to experience a partial 
transition toward success. 
 
H1c) States that successfully meet their overall Tier I, Tier II, and Tier III 
obligations are more likely to experience a significant transition toward either 
success. 
 
 
The first hypothesis (H1a), along with all the hypotheses, represents the core assumed 
relationship between the Tier I obligation of security and the occurrence of successful or failing 
transitions for states. It is the belief of this study that the primary public good of security is a 
prerequisite for all types of successful transitions. States that do not meet this obligation are 
unable to provide any form of the lower level of obligations and will result in a transition 
towards failure at the significant level for a state based off increases to its overall fragility risk. 
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The fulfillment of this primary obligation allows for the state to operate in a proper function, 
allowing the state to provide further types of goods and services and increasing its chances to 
experience some level of successful transition. It is the view of this study that Tier I obligations 
alone cannot influence the occurrence of a successful transition. Only the addition of the other 
goods and services provided in the other tiers of obligations may initiate a successful transition.  
The second hypothesis (H1b) represents the relationship between the obligations of fair 
and open governance and the occurrence of state success. The obligations of good governance 
have been standard explanations for improvements to state stability and success for weak and 
fragile states (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Bates, 2008a; Chesterman et al, 2005). According 
to this hypothesis, the fulfillment of the Tier II obligations of good governance, along with the 
fulfillment of the Tier I obligation of security, will result in the modest success of the state with 
the occurrence of a partial successful transition. The Tier II obligations deal with style of 
governance and the respect for the rule of law within a state. This study shall contend that a state 
which meets its Tier II obligations will strengthen the relationship it has with its public, 
strengthening the state’s overall legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens. With this hypothesis is 
also an inverse relationship when a state fails to meet its Tier II obligations. It is expected that 
states that do not meet this level of obligation, even with the fulfillment of their Tier I obligation, 
will likely experience a partial failing transition. 
 The final hypothesis (H1c) represents the completion of all levels of obligation and its 
relationship on influencing the occurrence of state success at the highest level. This hypothesis 
follows the argument by Rotberg on the importance for the state to provide an abundance of 
goods and services when discussing state strength and state stability (2003). While this 
hypothesis focuses on the lowest level of obligation, Tier III obligations, the public goods and 
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services provided by the state under the Tier III level may have the highest potential in 
explaining the success of states. The Tier III obligation level consist of a plurality of the rights 
found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, incorporating all aspects of and 
individual’s economic and social development. This includes access to education, medical and 
health care, the promotion of economic opportunity, the promotion of civil society, and the 
creation of social equality.  
The choice of providing the goods and services found under the Tier III obligations 
define a state’s purpose and values. As there are multiple types of goods that fall under the Tier 
III level, this study will only focus on a select number of obligations. This includes the overall 
human development of a population to serve as a proxy for the education, health, and level of 
equality in a society and the level of economic opportunity within a state. With the previous 
hypothesis, this hypothesis also shares an inverse relationship where the lack of meeting its Tier 
III obligation may result in a partial failing transition for states.  
Along with the primary hypothesis, this study will also test two competing hypotheses on 
the effect of good governance and economic growth on promoting success for states. The first 
competing hypothesis focuses solely on the quality of governance in its ability, efficiency, and 
liberalization as the prime influence with the occurrence of state failure and state success. This 
hypothesis contends that good governance which promotes the protection of personal freedoms 
and liberal democratic institutions enhances state stability. Inversely, poor governance that 
promotes corruption and political repression increases state fragility and the risk of state failure 
occurring. With this focus on governance, this study will test the following hypothesis:       
 
H2) States that improve their level of governance through effectiveness and 
liberalization are more likely to experience a partial or significant successful 
transition. 
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The second competing hypothesis focuses on the argument that economic growth is a 
solution for weak and fragile states (Collier, 2008). This hypothesis contends that economic 
growth promotes political stability in a state and reduces many of the detrimental problems 
fragile states face, such as poverty and low levels of development. As with the previous 
hypothesis, declines in economic growth and individual and national wealth will have a negative 
impact on state stability and influence the occurrence of state failure. With a focus on economic 
growth, this study will test the following hypothesis: 
 
H3) States that experience economic growth are more likely to experience a 
partial or significant successful transition). 
 
This study does not reject the theoretical arguments that these competing hypotheses are 
based upon. Good governance and economic growth are important aspects that are necessary for 
state success and this study includes features of governance and economic growth as parts of a 
state obligations. It is the opinion of this study that the competing hypotheses cannot explain 
occurrences of state success alone. Only with the inclusion of the other tiers of obligations is 
state success possible. This study expects to find limited effects from the included governance 
and economic indicators with regards to their determining effect on occurrences of state success 
and state failure.  
Methodology and Models 
 The methodology that this study will employ is quantitative. This study will estimate a 
series of multinomial logit regressions to test whether the fulfillment of any identified 
obligations of the state have a significant impact on a state experiencing a successful or failing 
transition. This methodology will be utilized to best suit the dependent variable of state success 
and state failure transitions, as the dependent variable is coded as a trivariate categorical variable 
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with {0} representing no occurrence of a successful or failing transition, {1} representing an 
occurrence of a partial transition for a state, and {2} representing and occurrence of a significant 
transition of success or failure for a state. Relying on a multinomial logit regression model, this 
study will be able to determine how the change in any of the hypothesized causal variables 
impacts the odds of a transition occurring at each level (Pampel, 2000). To test the hypotheses 
and their proposed causal relationships behind the occurrence of the different levels of state 
success and state failure, analyses on success and failure will be run separately to determine if 
the variables have a specific impact on each type of transition.26 Each model will be estimated 
with the same explanatory variables, only differing in the dependent variable. By conducting 
discrete analyses, any significant findings from these analyses may be compared to better 
identify which variables have the highest impact on influencing the occurrence of a state 
transition.27 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26. A complete multinomial regression model that includes occurrences of state success and state failure in 
the single analysis is provided in Appendix 4. Results from this complete model mirror the results from the separate 
analyses. An ordered logit model was also run (not included in the Appendix), with similar results being found as 
well.  
27. This study has relied on the use of multinomial regression models instead of the use OLS due to the 
subjectivity of the data on state fragility.  The preferred source of state fragility data for this study comes from the 
Fund for Peace’s Fragile State Index surveys. The FSI has been criticized by some for its usage of a proprietary 
software that scans new articles and reports on states, looking for key terms that indicate effects to a state’s fragility. 
This has led to concerns over a lack of transparency and objectivity in their process of evaluating states. They have 
also been criticized for overlooking key aspects of state weakness, such as inadequate healthcare and education 
(Rice and Patrick, 2008). While data on state fragility is available from other sources, the FSI is still the preferred 
data for this study, as its rankings of states match up with other analyses of state fragility and its lack of focus on 
certain public goods such as education and healthcare will provide creditability to the analysis’s findings. To 
account for potential subjectivity in their assigning of fragility risk levels, the use of categorical variables to identify 
noticeable changes to a state’s fragility level is implemented with this study. An OLS model has been included in 
Appendix 4, whose results mirror the findings from the multinomial regression models.  
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The Data 
Data for this analysis will focus on the 178 states covered by the Fund for Peace’s 
Fragile State Index (FSI) surveys from the years 2006 to 2016. 28 The FSI’s fragility index score 
is developed by rating a state’s risk of failure based upon twelve indicators of a state’s political, 
economic, and social aspects. The specific indicators of the FSI are composed of the following 
factors: demographic pressures; the existence of refugees and internally displaced persons; the 
level of group grievances; the level of human flight and brain drain; the level of uneven 
economic development; the level and occurrence of poverty and economic decline; the 
legitimacy of the state in the eyes of the public; public service capability; human rights and the 
rule of law; security apparatus capability; the existence of factionalized elites; and the occurrence 
of external intervention into a state (Fund for Peace, 2016). These factors may be considered as 
multiple forms of stress that are placed onto the state, weakening the states capability to govern 
and lowering its legitimacy in the eyes of its public. Every state in the survey is graded with a 
score of one to ten for each indicator, with higher scores representing higher levels of stress from 
that indicator. Each indicator is then summed together to give the total index score, with a 
possible range of twelve to one-hundred and twenty. States receiving higher index scores are 
viewed as being subject to a greater risk of failure. Corresponding security, economic, and 
development data that will be utilized in the explanatory variables have been collected from the 
data banks of several international development programs and think tanks. These include the 
United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Reports, the World Bank’s 
                                                 
28. Four states are dropped in this analysis due to data issues. This includes Somalia and North Korea for 
lack of data in the explanatory variables; Israel/West Bank for their fragility scores being combined between the two 
while explanatory data has been recorded for both entities separately; and South Sudan for lacking fragility data up 
until 2012, as it was not officially recognized as being independent until July 9, 2011. A complete list of states 
included in each analysis and the transitions they have experienced can be found in Appendix 2.  
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World Development Indicators and Worldwide Governance Indicators and the Center for 
Systemic Peace’s State Fragility Index. 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable for this analysis will measure the occurrence of a transition of a 
state along the success-failure continuum according to the significant transition approach. 
Transitions for states will be measured by comparing data on state fragility provided by the FSI’s 
annual survey, comparing the initial fragility score of a state from the 2006 survey with the latest 
fragility score of the same state from the 2016 survey.29;30 According to this approach, there are 
four potential forms of transitions states may undertake. Transitions for states are defined as 
having occurred when their fragility index score difference surpasses one of two potential 
thresholds. These thresholds have been determined based off the structure of the fragility 
rankings from the Fund for Peace’s annual FSI surveys, which serves as the source of data for 
the dependent variable.  
This study has made the preference to identify state transitions by the thresholds of five-
and ten-point differences in their fragility index scores. These thresholds have been determined 
based off the categorization methodology used by the Fund for Peace with the FSI. Following the 
FSI surveys, states are differentiated based on their fragility score, placing each state into a 
ranked risk category organized along ten point intervals.31 For substantial changes to a state’s 
                                                 
29. Each FSI survey measures state fragility for the previous year. For example, the 2006 survey measures 
fragility scores for states from 2005.  
30. The 2006 FSI survey did not include all 178 states that have been found in later FSI surveys. For these 
missing states, their initial fragility score was taken from the 2007 survey. These states include: Antigua & Barbuda, 
Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Brunei Darussalam, Cape Verde, Comoros, Congo (Republic), Djibouti, Fiji, 
Grenada, Guyana, Iceland, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Maldives, Malta, Micronesia, Montenegro, Qatar, 
Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Suriname, Swaziland, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and 
Tobago, United Arab Emirates.  
31. These categories include (in order form least fragile to most fragile): Sustainable, Very Stable, More 
Stable, Stable, Warning, Elevated Warning, High Warning, Alert, High Alert, Very High Alert (Fund for Peace, 
2016). 
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fragility level, identified in this study as a significant-transition, a state would move from at least 
one category in the ranked organization to an adjacent riskier or securer category. Moving along 
the continuum to a new category would require states to either increase or decrease their fragility 
score be ten points or more, thus establishing the higher threshold of ten points for significant 
transitions.  
For partial transitions, which represent a noticeable shift in states’ fragility levels but not 
a complete categorical change, the lower threshold of five points has been determined. This 
lower threshold may be justified, as, according to the FSI data on changes to states’ fragility 
scores over the period 2005 -2015, a majority of states have had their fragility score change by at 
least five points (94 states out for 178 states). A rudimentary analysis of the FSI data also reveals 
that states that surpass a five-point difference in their FSI scores sometime within the focused 
ten-year period are more likely to see further increases to the difference in their index scores by 
the 2016 survey than have their fragility return to levels near their 2006 fragility level. This 
indicates the five-point threshold as a tipping-point, where once surpassed allows for further 
changes to a state’s fragility level with little likelihood of fragility reverting to its former level.32 
For this analysis, each of type of transition will be estimated in separate state failure and 
state success models. The first model, labeled Model 1, will consist of occurrences of state 
failure. The dependent variable in this model, DV1, will include measures of partial failing 
transitions and significant failing transitions. The second model, labeled Model 2, will focus on 
occurrences of state success. The dependent variable in this model, DV2, will measure the 
occurrence of partial successful transitions and significant successful transitions for states. To 
identifying transitions in states, a state which has a difference in its fragility index scores from 
                                                 
32. To further justify the use of the five-point threshold, five points is also the closest whole number to the 
standard deviation of the mean of changes to states FSI scores between 2006 and 2016 (σx = 4.67)  
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the 2006 and 2016 FSI surveys with a magnitude of greater than or equal to (+/-)5.00 points, but 
less than (+/-)10.00 points, the transition is defined as a partial transition. If the difference in the 
fragility index has a magnitude of greater than or equal to (+/-)10.00 points, the transition is 
defined as a significant transition. Positive scores in the index differences represent states that 
have had their fragility risk increase between the initial survey and the 2016 survey. Any states 
that meet the two transition thresholds with a positive value are categorized as experiencing 
either a partial or significant failing transition. Negative scores in the index differences represent 
states that have had their fragility risk decrease between the initial survey and the 2016 survey. 
Any states that meet the two transition thresholds with a negative value are categorized as 
experiencing either a partial or significant successful transition. Any cases that do not meet these 
thresholds are defined as not experiencing a transition.  
Both dependent variables shall follow the same coding scheme: all cases of a no 
transition occurring are coded as a value of {0}, all cases of a partial transition occurring are 
coded as a value of {1}, and all cases of significant transitions occurring are coded as a value of 
{2}. Table 10 identifies the two dependent variables with their coding schemes. 
 
Table 10. Dependent Variables and their Identifying Transitions with Coding Schemes 
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Explanatory Variables  
 Table 11 lists the included explanatory variables in the analysis. These variables are 
separated into the different levels of obligations for states, along with included control variables. 
The description, operationalization, measurement, and hypothesized results of these variables are 
discussed below. 
 
Table 11. Description of Explanatory Variables 
 
Tier I Obligations – Security 
Total Security – The variable Total Security is an indicator of overall security for an 
individual in a state. This variable consists of the core obligation found under the Tier I level. 
The indicator measures security as a composite of the level of violent conflict and the 
vulnerability to political violence within a state along with the overall level of repression from 
the government. This variable is operationalized by taking the difference between a state’s 
“Security Effectiveness Score” and the difference between a state’s “Security Legitimacy Score” 
for the years 2005 to 2015 and summing the two differences together for an overall score on state 
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security.33 This variable is measured as an index with a seven-point scale (ranging from -3 to 
+3), with higher values indicating greater occurrences of violence, vulnerability to conflict, and 
state repression.  
 Following the hypotheses, this study expects to find the Total Security variable to be 
significant in every model. This variable is expected to show a negative relationship based on the 
coefficient with models on state success and positive relationships with models on state failure.  
Tier II Obligations – Governance 
Voice Accountability- The variable Voice Accountability measures the level of openness 
and political freedoms expected to be respected under the Tier II obligations of a state. This 
variable is an indicator how a state governs based off universally accepted freedoms, such as the 
freedom of expression, association, and media, basing its measures off the public’s perceptions 
of their rights and freedoms as well as their ability to participate in selecting their government. 
This variable is operationalized by taking the difference between a state’s “Voice Accountability 
Estimate” index score from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicator for the years 
2005 and 2015 (World Bank Data Bank, 2016). The “Voice Accountability Estimate” is an 
aggregate indicator ranging in a normal standard distribution from -2.5 to 2.5, with positive 
values representing higher perceptions of freedom and accountability in governance and lower 
scores representing low perceptions of freedom and government accountability.  
Rule of Law- The variable Rule of Law measures the level of fairness and respect for the 
established rules regarding the enforcement of the law by the state. This variable measures this 
Tier II obligation by gaging the amount of confidence the public has in the rules of society, 
including contract enforcement, protection of property rights, and the independence and 
                                                 
33. Data for these indicators come from the Center for Systemic Peace’s State Fragility Index (Center for 
Systemic Peace, 2016). 
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accountability of the police and the courts. Included in this variable is also perceptions of overall 
crime and violence in a state, which is an important aspect of the Tier I obligation of security, but 
is not picked up by the variable Total Security. This variable is operationalized by taking the 
difference between a state’s “Rule of Law Estimate” index score from the World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicator for the years 2005 and 2015 (World Bank Data Bank, 2016). 
The “Rule of Law Estimate” is an aggregate indicator ranging in a normal standard distribution 
from -2.5 to 2.5, with positive values representing higher perceptions of respect for the rule of 
law and lower scores representing low perceptions for the respect of law.  
 Following the second and third hypotheses, this study expects both the Voice 
Accountability and Rule of Law variables to have significance in all the analyses, with positive 
relationships, representing perceived improvements of governance by the state, to be found in the 
models on state success and negative relationships, representing worsening governing practices, 
in models on state failure. 
Polity Score- The variable Polity Score measures the style of governance for a state based 
off its regime type, ranging between levels of autocracy and democracy. While democracy is not 
specifically mentioned as a right in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, many political 
freedoms found in the Declaration that fall under the Tier II obligations are found mainly in 
democratic states. This variable is operationalized by taking the mean value of a state’s “Polity2” 
score from The Center for Systemic Peace’s Polity IV Project, between the years 2005 to 2015 
(Marshall et al, 2016).34 The Polity score measures the type of government for a state based on a 
scale of -10 to +10, with negative scores representing autocracy and positive scores representing 
democracy. This study has not taken an account of democracy as being necessary in the 
                                                 
34. Data for this variable has been collected from the Polity IV project (Marshall et al, 2016).  
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hypotheses, but following the other governance variables, this study would expect more 
democratic states to find success than autocratic states. If this is found to be significant in any of 
the models, this study would expect to see a positive relationship, representing democracy, to be 
found the models on state success and negative coefficients, representing autocracy, the models 
on state failure. 
Besides their inclusion of these variables under the Tier II obligations, these variables 
will also test the first competing hypothesis on good governance and liberal democracy as a 
determining factor behind state success. If this hypothesis (H2) is to be accepted, it will be 
expected for the governance variables to achieve significance with negative relationships in cases 
of state failure and positive relationships with cases of state success.   
Tier III Obligations – Economic and Human Development 
GDP Growth- The variable GDP Growth will test the obligation of economic opportunity 
by measuring the improving economic opportunity in a state’s overall economy. This variable is 
operationalized by taking the mean of a state’s GDP growth (measured as a percentage of GDP) 
for the years 2005 to 2015.35 Testing this variable, this study will be able to see how overall 
improving economic situations impact the likelihood of success.  
GNI per Capita – The variable GNI per Capita will test the economic obligations of a 
state with a focus on the economic situation for individuals. This variable is operationalized by 
taking the difference in a state’s gross national income per capita between the years 2005 and 
2015.36 With high economic growth, it would be expected to see greater economic opportunity 
for an overall public and thus a positive reinforcement for the state. Following the preferred 
                                                 
35. Data for this variable has been collected from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
Databank (World Bank, 2016). 
36. GNI per Capita is measured in 2011 PPP$.  Data for this variable has been collected from the United 
Nation’s Development Programme (2016) and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators Databank (2016). 
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hypothesis, it is expected for both economic opportunity variables to achieve significance in 
influencing occurrences of state success and state failure, with positive relationships 
corresponding with cases of success and negative relationships occurring with cases of failure.  
Including the two economic opportunity variables in the analysis will also allow for the testing of 
the competing hypothesis on improved economic outcomes driving occurrences of state success. 
Following the competing hypothesis (H3), it would be expected to find greater economic 
opportunity to have an influence on the occurrence of state success and declines in economic 
opportunity to influence the occurrence of state failure. 
Human Development– The variable Human Development serves as proxy variable to test 
the overall impact of the development goods found under the Tier III obligations. This variable is 
operationalized by taking the mean value of a state’s Human Development Index (HDI) score 
provided from the United Nation’s Development Programme’s Human Development Reports 
from the years 2005 to 2015. The Human Development Index is a composite measure of the 
capability of a people based off three primary dimensions, including a long and healthy life, 
being knowledgeable, and a decent standard of living (United Nations Development Programme, 
2016). Relying on multiple indicators for each these dimensions, the HDI is constructed into a 
geometric mean of normalized indices of the three dimensions. Taking the mean of the three 
dimensions’ indexes, the HDI measures development on a scale of zero to one (0.0 to 1.0), with 
higher values indicating higher levels of a population’s development within a state. Figure 9 
breaks down the construction of the HDI. 
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Figure 8. The Human Development Index 
  
 
Based off the third hypothesis, the Tier III obligation variables are expected to be found 
significant with the model on significant successful transitions. This study expects to find 
positive relationships in this model. This study also expects to see an inverse relationship with 
the Tier III obligations in cases of state failure.  
Control Variables 
 This study will include a set of control variables that measure the size of states’ economy 
and population to test whether states with large economies or populations are more likely to 
experience a successful or failing transition. These control variables include the variable GDP, 
which measures the size of a state’s economy, and the variable Population, which measures the 
size of a state’s population. The variable GDP is operationalized by taking the mean value from 
a state’s GDP in five-year interval measures during the years 2005 to 2015 (2005; 2010; 
2015).37;38 The variable Population is operationalized by taking the mean value from a state’s 
total population between the years 2005 to 2015.39  
                                                 
37. GDP is recorded in 2011PPP$. Data for this variable has been collected from the United Nation’s 
Development Programme’s Human Development Reports. Any missing data for the year 2015 has been recorded 
with the next available year of GDP measurement for a state.  
38. GDP data for Syria has been estimated based off its 2015 GDP (Central Intelligence Agency, 2016). 
39. Data is collected from the United Nations Development Programme (2016).  
(Source: United Nations Development Programme, 2016) 
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Model 
 This study will estimate two multinomial logit regression models to test whether the 
fulfillment of the different state obligations has a significant effect on influencing a successful or 
failing state transition. The models for the study analysis are presented in Figure 10.  
 
Figure 9. Models for State Obligation and State Transitions  
 
Model 2= 
Model 1= 
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Findings 
 The statistical results from the analysis are presented in Tables 12 and 13. The findings of 
this analysis indicate state obligation as having an important impact on influencing the 
occurrence of either state success or state failure at the partial and significant transition levels.  
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Table 12. Results of Model 1 State Failure 
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Table 13. Results of Model 2 State Success  
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 Focusing on the Tier I obligation of security, the results from the models indicate the 
expected outcome laid out in the first hypothesis (H1). In Model 1, on transitions of state failure, 
the variable Total Security achieves significance with partial and significant failing transitions. 
The relationship between this variable and the dependent variable are in the correct hypothesized 
direction.  These results show that the decline in security for the individual in a state influences 
the occurrence of a failing transition. Based off these results, this study can only accept the first 
hypothesis (H1a).  
 While the statistical results do support a causal relationship between Tier I obligations 
and occurrences of state failure, the results do not indicate the same effect of security on 
occurrences of state success. The results from Model 2 on state success indicate no causal 
relationship between security and success for states. The variable Total Security did not achieve 
significance with either of the possible successful transitions. These findings would negate the 
other hypotheses, H1b and H1c, as they placed Tier I obligations as prerequisite for success. 
While the statistical results cannot support a causal relationship between Tier I obligations and 
occurrences of state success, the impact of security on state success should not be written off. 
Reviewing the summary statistics of this variable, it appears that the lack of variation between 
states regarding their level of security may have prevented any accurate findings on the impact of 
this variable. Figure 11 illustrates this lack of variation with a histogram of the variable Total 
Security. This histogram of the variable shows the distribution to be centered around the value of 
{0}, which represents no change regarding a state’s security situation between the years 2005 to 
2015. According to this data, most states don’t experience major changes to their security 
situation.  Accounting for the results in Model 1, it is the assumption of this study that so along 
as a state does not experience a reduction in its security, states can experience an occurrence of 
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state success. Any state which has experienced success, would require some level of security to 
function properly.   
Figure 10. Histogram of Variable Total Security 
 
The next level of obligation presents varying results among its different variables and the 
different types of state transitions. Focusing on occurrences of state failure in Model 1, the Tier 
II obligations on good governance and the respect for the rule of law present mixed results in 
having a casual effect on the occurrence of state failure. The variable Voice Accountability did 
not achieve significance in any type of transition. The variable Rule of Law demonstrates a 
causal impact on state failure, as this variable achieves significance in significant failing 
transitions only. This variable has the proper hypothesized relationship with the dependent 
variable.  
The final variable in the Tier II obligation, Polity Score, achieves significance with 
significant failing transitions as well. These results have an interesting implication, as the 
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positive coefficient for the Polity Score variable would indicate that democracy as a style of 
governance would have a significant impact on slightly worsening a state’s fragility level. The 
relationship between state failure and democracy is not an unanticipated finding, as other studies 
on state failure have found states undergoing democratic transitions as being highly susceptible 
to political instability (Goldstone et al, 2010).  
The findings on the Tier II obligations in Model 2 present a slightly greater impact of 
governance in influencing the occurrence of state success. Again, the variable Rule of Law 
achieves significance, this time with both forms of successful transitions. This variable is also in 
the proper hypothesized relationship with the dependent variable. The variable Voice 
Accountability indicates better results with cases of state success than state failure, as this 
variable achieves success with cases of significant successful transitions, but not partial-
successful transitions. The variable Polity Score did not achieve significance, indicating regime 
type has no significant impact on the occurrence of success. Overall, these findings indicate that 
the Tier II obligations have a strong influence on the occurrence of state success.  
From these results, this study may accept the second component of the first hypothesis 
(H1b). These results indicate the importance for the support for the rule law, which includes 
fairness and justice in legal matters. Declines in the respect for this aspect of governance has a 
strong influence on the occurrence of state failure. These results also reaffirm the importance of 
security with the findings, as higher perceptions of crime and violence measured in the variable 
Rule of Law coincide with the occurrence of state failure at the significant level. The results from 
Model 2 show the importance of good governance regarding fairness and accountability in the 
political system in influencing the occurrence of state success. Relying on these variables to 
verify the first competing hypothesis (H2), this hypothesis on good governance can only be 
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included on a limited basis. While aspects of good governance did show to have a positive 
impact on states achieving success, the lack of democracy or an open political process do not 
causally relate to the occurrence of state failure or state success. 
  The final level of obligation for states, the Tier III obligations, present mixed results 
regarding their impact on influencing the occurrence of state failure or state success. These 
results show that the third portion of the first hypothesis (H1c) can only be partially accepted, as 
only one type of public good appears to have an influence on occurrence of state success and 
state failure. The findings from Model 1 on state failure indicate that only the public goods that 
promote the development of a state’s populace has an influence on the occurrence of a failing 
transition. The variable Human Development achieves significance with both cases of failing 
transitions. This variable has the expected hypothesized relationship with the dependent variable, 
with lower levels of human development influencing the occurrence of state failure. In Model 2 
on state success, Human Development again shows an influential impact on the occurrence of a 
state transition. With both partial and significant successful transitions, Human Development 
achieves significance. This variable is once again in the hypothesized relationship, with higher 
levels of human development influencing the occurrence of state success.  
Of the economic opportunity variables, none of these variables achieved significance in 
either model. Overall, these findings cause for partial rejection of the Tier III hypothesis (H1c) 
around the economic obligations of the state and full rejection of the second competing 
hypothesis (H3) on economic growth influencing the occurrence of state success. The economic 
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obligations of the state appear to have no impact on the occurrence state success and or state 
failure.40 
The control variables produced no results that would indicate their impact on occurrences 
of state success or failure.  The variation in the size of a state’s economy and population appears 
to vary considerably among successful and failing states, along with cases of states that have not 
seen any significant changes to their fragility level.41 
  Conclusion 
The findings from the analysis indicate a strong support for the importance of state 
obligation as determining factor behind state success. These results indicate that we may accept 
the preferred hypotheses of this study, with some limitations. Each of the different levels of 
obligation for states maintains a causal relationship with the occurrence of state failure and state 
success at some level. The Tier I obligation of security maintains an expected relationship with 
the occurrence of state failure and, while not shown in the data, it can be expected that 
maintaining security is important for the occurrence of success for states. The Tier II obligations 
on good governance also have an important impact on the success of states, although democracy 
and political liberalization do not appear to influence successful state transitions. Considering the 
last level of obligations, the Tier III obligations have been found to have a strong impact on the 
occurrence of state success with the fulfillment of the obligations on promoting development of a 
state.  The economic obligations of the state do not appear to have an effect on promoting 
success for states.     
                                                 
40. In additional run models, the variable GDP Growth does achieve significance with declines in GDP 
growth corresponding with increases to fragility and increases in growth corresponding with occurrences of state 
success at the significant transition level (see Appendix 4). 
41. The control variables appear to be highly correlated with one another (see correlations matrix in 
Appendix 3). These variables were removed from the analysis and run separately with only one of them included.  
No major difference was seen in the results with their inclusion or absence from the model. 
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Of these findings, the Tier III obligations on human development appear to have some of 
the most important impact on understanding state success. The analysis shows that human 
development policies regarding education, health, and equality have some of the strongest 
impacts on the occurrence of success for states. The inverse relationships found with human 
development and state failure, with low levels of development influencing the occurrence of state 
failure, add robustness to the argument of state-obligation as an explanatory concept towards the 
functionality of states. The importance of the Tier III obligations will be investigated in the 
concluding chapter.  Overall, the concept of state obligation appears to be a robust explanation 
behind the success of states. The concluding chapter shall review these finding and any potential 
policy applications that may benefit from these results.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
 This study has attempted to redefine the way we view and analyze failed states in the 
world. With a focus on state behavior as the defining characteristic between failing and 
successful states, this study has introduced a new approach to the understanding of one of the 
most significant political phenomenon to occur for the beginning of the 21st century. The theory 
of state behavior and the separate tiers of obligations of states is an important addition to the 
discourse of state failure, as it allows for a stronger foundation for the conceptualization of state 
failure and its causes. The statistical findings from the analysis also clearly establish a link 
between state success based on the fulfillment of tiers of obligations for states and the 
strengthening of the state based on its level of fragility. These findings are important, as they 
show that typical considerations of state failure, being a state’s level of fragility, is directly tied 
to the behavior of states in meeting its obligations. The strong statistical findings supporting the 
fulfillment of development obligations, such as education, healthcare, and equality, are important 
revelation as well, as they will allow for the development of more efficient policies to deal with 
cases of state failure. Overall, this study has shown that states may reduce their level of fragility 
and risk of failure by fulfilling their multiple obligations.   
The phenomenon of state failure is a complex concept that produces a myriad of 
difficulties and risks for states.  A status of failure is not a preordained destination for fragile and 
weak states, as recent occurrences of success for states have been observed. This study has 
attempted to explain why states avoid failure and experience a shift towards success by meeting 
the expected standards of statehood. Focusing on the modern interpretation of statehood our 
contemporary expectations on the proper behavior of states, this study has developed a revised 
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theory of state behavior that explains the occurrence of state success through the fulfillment of 
the various obligations expected of the state. These obligations include the providing of public 
goods and services that a people under the authority of the state would require for them to meet 
their full economic, civic, and social potential. By dividing these obligations into three 
hierarchical tiers, this study has shown that the completion of these various obligations has a 
significant effect on influencing the occurrence of state success.  This study has also shown an 
inverse relationship exists between the nonfulfillment of a state’s obligations and the occurrence 
of state failure. Overall the findings of this study provide a new insight into the issue of state 
failure and the robustness of the theory of state behavior in explaining the occurrence of failure. 
The following sections shall review the findings of the analysis and look at the implications of 
these results for the study of state failure in the future.       
Consideration of the Findings 
The findings from the analysis reaffirm the revised theory of state behavior promoted by 
this study, where state obligation serves as a strong factor behind the success of states. These 
findings show the importance of state obligations as being a foundation for state functionality 
and their connection to the amount of fragility a state risks. The fulfillment of a state’s 
obligations helps with the security and development of a state’s public, which correspond with 
positive gains to a state’s authority and legitimacy. These improvements allow for the 
occurrences of success for states based off reductions to their level of fragility. Overall, the 
analysis presents robust findings on the importance for states to provide security, good 
governance, and development for their populaces as a strategy for state success.  
From analysis, the three tiers of obligations can be observed a having some level of 
impact on the occurrence of either transitions of state success of state failure. Looking at the 
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occurrences of state failure, the analysis shows the influence of the variables for Tiers I, II, and 
III with partial and significant failing transitions when these obligations have not been met. The 
Tier I obligation of security shows to have an impact on state failure. States that have seen their 
security decline over the given timeframe of 2005 to 2015 experienced increases to their fragility 
risk. Similar results with the variable Rule of Law and its consideration of crime and violence in 
a state also reaffirms the importance of security, with its absence being a direct influence on the 
occurrence of state failure. 
Besides confirming the effect of the Tier I obligation on state failure, the findings from 
the analysis also confirm the strong impact that the Tier II and III obligations have on 
influencing states to a status of failure when they are not fulfilled. The Tier II obligation for good 
governance based on the respect for the rule of law and fairness and justice in the legal system 
has a strong relationship with the occurrence of state failure at the highest intensity. These results 
directly link a state’s poor behavior to the occurrence of state failure, as poor perceptions of how 
the state governs in respect to the established laws weaken the state’s overall legitimacy in the 
eyes of the public. The findings on governance indicators also present the appearance of a 
contradiction, as the analysis shows democracy not to be a prescription against preventing state 
failure, and instead serve as a potential cause for the significant increase to a state’s level of 
fragility.   
The Tier III obligations also have an important impact on the occurrence of state failure 
with the consideration of the development aspects of education, health, and social equality. The 
variable based off the Human Development Index shows a strong influence on significant state 
failure transitions, indicating the lack of development as being a strong indicator for the potential 
occurrences of state failure. These results are also directly tied to the behavior of states, as states 
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set their own development levels with their preferences on certain policies. States choose how to 
spend their resources, with poor behaving states following corrupt practices and not investing in 
the development of their people through the provision of education, health care, and other 
necessary public goods.  
Reviewing the findings from the analysis on state success, a mirror image of the state 
failure model can be seen with the fulfillment state obligation directly influencing the occurrence 
of successful state transitions. While this model does not produce similar results with all the 
variables in the previous models, the analysis does show once again the importance of state 
behavior in the Tier II and Tier III levels of obligation. An unexpected result from this analysis is 
the non-relationship that the Tier I obligation of security has with the occurrence of state success. 
The hypotheses of this study placed the Tier I obligation as being a primary requirement for a 
state to have a successful transition. The lack of a relationship between the security and state 
success may be the result of problems with the data, as discussed in the previous chapter. This 
result may also indicate that security is not enough to improve a state’s overall level of fragility.  
While states that have recently concluded a prolonged period of civil war may see a large 
reprieve in their level of fragility with the cessation of hostilities, typical states which have not 
had a serious conflict recently would not see many gains after the initial required level of 
security is met. 
While the Tier I obligation failed to show a relationship with state success, the Tier II and 
Tier III obligations continue to show an important influence on state fragility levels. For the Tier 
II obligations on good governance, the respect for the rule of law has a direct relationship on 
promoting the success of the state with both partial and significant transitions of success. As this 
indicator on good governance was also found to have a direct relationship with state failure with 
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regards to bad governance by states, this indicator should be considered as a primary motivator 
behind state transitions. Although the indicator for democracy shows no relationship with a 
state’s transitions regarding its fragility, the findings do show that government accountability and 
openness does have an impact on successful transitions at the significant transition level. These 
results would indicate that complete authoritarian systems would not likely see transitions of 
state success, as some form of liberalized political institutions would be required. While the 
findings from the governance indicators prevents the full acceptance of the competing hypothesis 
of good governance and democracy as a driving influence behind state success, these findings do 
show importance fair and accountable governance has in promoting occurrences of success. As 
these two governing indicators are recorded as perceptions of the public about their government, 
these results do provide support for the theory of state behavior influencing the level of fragility 
in states. 
The connection between state behavior and state success can be notably seen with the 
fulfillment of part of the Tier III obligations. Considering the economic opportunity variables, 
the findings from the analysis cannot claim the influence of economic opportunity or growth on 
occurrences of state success. This is not the case when considering the development obligations 
of the state under the Tier III level, as these obligations show some of the strongest effects on 
state success. The findings of the analysis show human development, measured as the Human 
Development Index, as having a direct effect on both partial and significant successful 
transitions. The provision of the public goods of education, health, and equality have an immense 
impact on how people interact and view the state, which directly affects a state’s legitimacy, 
authority, and sovereignty. The importance of these specific public goods can be seen in further 
analyses. Additional individual multivariate logit regression analyses that look at only 
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occurrences of significant successful transitions show how proxy measures for the public goods 
of education, health care, and social equality all have significant impact on the occurrence of 
state success (see Appendix 4). These results with the other models provide robustness behind 
the argument that state obligation is directly tied to the likelihood of states to expertise a positive 
shift regarding their level of fragility. The inverse relationship found in the state failure analysis 
also provides robustness to this view, as it also confirms the importance of the state to provide 
these types of public goods.  
Implications of the Importance of State Obligation on State Success 
 The largest contribution of this study to the discourse on state failure has been the 
acknowledgement of the importance of state behavior and the provision of public goods as an 
obligation of the state in aiding in the prevention of state failure. A major implication from this 
analysis is how states should be evaluated when considering the situation of state failure. As this 
study has shown, state failure is more than just a static situation that plagues weak or fragile 
states. All states are susceptible of suffering negative shifts to their fragility when we consider 
the functionality of states and the failure of states to meet their obligations and responsibilities 
towards its public. By focusing on how states meet their responsibility as a legitimate political 
authority, a more harmonized analysis of failing and failed states may exist between scholars and 
policymakers.   
 The results of the analysis validate the theory of state behavior as explaining the 
occurrence of state success and failure. This new approach to understanding state failure will add 
grater utility towards explaining the concept of state failure as well as improve the overall 
analysis on the developmental problems failing states. This study has shown that that policies 
and actions taken by states directly affect their political, economic, and security situations. The 
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level development for a state’s populace is directly tied to the education, health care, and social 
policies enacted by the state. While not all states are equal based on the resources they may have, 
concentrating on the responsibility of states in providing the necessary goods and services shall 
help with the development of a more focused strategy to aid fragile states avoid transitioning into 
a designation of failure.  
Instead of applying overarching policies of economic or political reform as a solution for 
these states, development policies focused on aiding in the providing of specific public goods 
such as education or healthcare will assist in the development of these states in a much more 
accountable and efficient manner. By looking at a state’s relationship with its public based off 
the state’s acknowledged responsibilities, development strategies may be focused directly on the 
identified unfulfilled obligations of the state. States that are lacking in education standards shall 
be aided with specific policies that promote the expansion of education in the state. States that 
have high mortality rates and poor living standards should be approached with aid strategies that 
directly improve the availability and standards of healthcare in a state. Governance issues, such 
as social equality, civil justice, and anti-corruption should be specifically laid out in the terms of 
any foreign aid strategies, where aid is only allocated to states when these obligations are being 
met to the best of the ability of the aid recipient state.  
Going Forward 
 This study has demonstrated the utility of the significant transition approach as an 
explanatory concept towards understanding and identifying the determinants of state success and 
state failure. The application of this new method of analysis will aid in the further understanding 
of fragile states and help find evidence for potential policies that may relieve the pressure of state 
failure on weak and fragile states. Further analysis is required to test the specific effects on the 
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state transitions, with a special consideration of enhanced situations of state failure, including 
civil wars and poor economic development.  
The importance of the Tier III obligations will need to be further examined to help 
develop specific policy solutions for state failure that focus on the development of populations. 
Conducting studies on specific educational and health care policies in states that have 
experienced successful transitions will provide a framework for future development policies.  
Conducting studies on these policies will also will also aid in the understanding of the 
relationship states have with their populations and how these specific policies impact the 
perception of the public on the legitimacy of the state. As the occurrence of state failure appears 
that it will not be resolved soon, more studies are needed to help find possible solutions to fragile 
states and to avoid the dangerous consequences that occur when states fail.   
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APPENDIX 1 
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMNAN RIGHTS 
Preamble 
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, 
 
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have 
outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall 
enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the 
highest aspiration of the common people, 
 
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to 
rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of 
law, 
 
Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations, 
 
Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights 
of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life 
in larger freedom, 
 
Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United 
Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, 
 
Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for 
the full realization of this pledge, 
 
Now, Therefore THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims THIS UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples 
and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this 
Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for 
these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their 
universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States 
themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.  
 
Article I. 
 All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason 
and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. 
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Article II. 
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made 
on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to 
which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other 
limitation of sovereignty. 
 
Article III.  
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person. 
 
Article IV.  
No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all 
their forms. 
 
Article V. 
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
 
Article VI. 
Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law. 
 
Article VII. 
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the 
law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this 
Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination. 
 
Article VIII.  
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts 
violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law. 
 
Article IX. 
 No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile. 
 
Article X.  
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial 
tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against 
him. 
 
Article XI.  
(1) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved 
guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his 
defence. 
(2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did 
not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was 
committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time 
the penal offence was committed. 
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Article XII.  
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the 
protection of the law against such interference or attacks. 
 
Article XIII.  
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each 
state. 
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country. 
 
Article XIV.  
(1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution. 
(2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-
political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 
 
Article XV.  
(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality. 
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his 
nationality. 
 
Article XVI.  
(1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have 
the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during 
marriage and at its dissolution. 
(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses. 
(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection 
by society and the State. 
 
Article XVII.  
(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. 
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. 
 
Article XVIII.  
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others 
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and 
observance. 
 
Article XIX.  
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold 
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any 
media and regardless of frontiers. 
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Article XX.  
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. 
(2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association. 
 
Article XXI.  
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through 
freely chosen representatives. 
(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country. 
(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be 
expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and 
shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. 
 
Article XXII.  
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, 
through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization 
and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his 
dignity and the free development of his personality. 
 
Article XXIII.  
(1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable 
conditions of work and to protection against unemployment. 
(2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work. 
(3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself 
and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other 
means of social protection. 
(4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 
 
Article XXIV.  
Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and 
periodic holidays with pay. 
 
Article XXV.  
(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of 
himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary 
social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, 
widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. 
(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether 
born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection. 
 
Article XXVI.  
(1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and 
fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional 
education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to 
all on the basis of merit. 
(2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the 
strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote 
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understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall 
further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace. 
(3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children. 
 
Article XXVII. 
(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the 
arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits. 
(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any 
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author. 
 
Article XXVIII. 
Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth 
in this Declaration can be fully realized. 
 
Article XXIX.  
(1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his 
personality is possible. 
(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations 
as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the 
rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and 
the general welfare in a democratic society. 
(3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations. 
 
Article XXX.  
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any 
right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights 
and freedoms set forth herein. 
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LIST OF STATE TRANSITIONS 
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DATA 
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CORRELATION MATRIX
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APPENDIX 4 
ADDITIONAL MODELS 
Complete Transitional Model 
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State Success Logit Models with alternative Development Indicators 
Model 3: Logit Models of Success with Human Development Variable 
 
110 
 
Model 4: Logit Model of Success with Alternative Development Indicators42 
                                                 
42. The variable Gender Development and Under Five Mortality Rate are operationalized by taking the 
mean value of a state’s “Gender Development Index” from five-year interval measures during the years 2005 to 
2015 (2005; 2010; 2015). The variable Expected Years of Schooling is operationalized by taking the mean value of a 
state’s “expected years of schooling” for a child from the years 2005 to 2015. Data comes from the United Nations 
Development Programme (2016). 
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Model 5: Multivariate OLS Regression Model with Continuous Dependent Variable43  
                                                 
 
43. Dependent Variable is operationalized at a difference between a state’s FSI score in 2006 and 2016 
{DV= FSI(2016) – FSI(2006)}. As positive values in the DV represent increases to a state’s level of fragility, and thus an 
occurrence of state failure, positive relationships with the explanatory variables represent influences to state failure 
and negative relationships represent influences on state success. Population is dropped due to its high correlation 
with GDP. 
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